Article

The Balance of Payments Performance of Latin America and the Caribbean, 1966–701

Author(s):
International Monetary Fund. Research Dept.
Published Date:
January 1972
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THE PRESENT STUDY of the balance of payments performance of Latin America and the Caribbean is essentially an empirical exercise in evaluating the performance and in relating it, on the one hand, to governmental policies and, on the other, to factors partially or entirely beyond the control of governments. The period reviewed is the five years 1966 through 1970. It needs to be emphasized that this study is strictly retrospective and in no way attempts to look into the future. Indeed, it is already apparent that the balance of payments performance of the region in 1971 marked a break with the favorable trend over the five years reviewed here.

All members of the International Monetary Fund in Latin America and the Caribbean—23 in number—have been covered in this study. This comprises all the independent states of the region with the sole exception of Cuba—an exception dictated by the nonavailability of the requisite information for that country, as Cuba is not a member of the International Monetary Fund.

The statistical information used was the most up to date available to the staff of the Fund. Provisional figures and estimates have had to be used in a few cases to complete the requisite time series. Inasmuch as all the figures were those available to and used by the Fund staff, no sources are cited in the tables that follow.

The study is divided into six sections. A quantitative assessment of the balance of payments performance of each of the 23 countries covered and of the region as a whole is given in the section that follows. Section II addresses itself to the much debated question of compatibility or incompatibility between balance of payments and economic growth objectives. Then follows a section that examines the major factors operating on the balance of payments but largely beyond the control of national authorities. In Section IV an attempt is made to assess the contribution to the balance of payments performance of governmental policies. The penultimate section deals with short-term capital movements. The final section illustrates the significance of the International Monetary Fund’s first allocation of special drawing rights to its members in Latin America and the Caribbean.

I. Balance of Payments Performance in 1966–70

During the five years 1966–70 a remarkably favorable balance of payments performance was achieved in Latin America and the Caribbean. Over this period, the 23 countries of the region covered in this study improved their combined net official international reserve positions by $3.3 billion, not counting the effect of the first allocation of special drawing rights, which added another $330 million to the international reserves of these countries. The net official international reserves of the 23 countries aggregated a mere $1.4 billion at the beginning of the period under review, and the $3.3 billion gain increased the region’s reserves in five years by nearly three and a half times.

It is noteworthy that this international reserve improvement gathered momentum from one year to the next during the period. Thus, of the five-year net official international reserve gain, only 5.7 per cent was registered in 1966, 9.2 per cent in 1967, 18.6 per cent in 1968, 29.6 per cent in 1969, and 36.8 per cent in 1970.

The international reserve gain was, in terms of amounts, very unevenly distributed among the countries of the region, but it was widely dispersed in terms of the number of beneficiaries. Five of the largest countries accounted for 87 per cent of the reserve gain of the region over the five years reviewed—Brazil alone accounted for 42 per cent of the regional total, Argentina for 18 per cent, Chile for 13 per cent, Peru for 8 per cent, and Colombia for 6 per cent. On the other hand, the wide dispersal of the reserve gain among countries is revealed by the fact that, of the 23 countries covered, 16 managed to improve their net official international reserves over this five-year period, although the individual reserve gains of a majority among the 16 were small. Seven countries registered a deterioration of their net official international reserve position. The largest loss in absolute terms was the Dominican Republic’s $12½ million; 4 of the 7 countries suffered losses of $5 million or less. Table 1 shows the balance of payments performance of each of the 23 countries, ranked in descending order of their absolute international reserve gain over the five-year period as a whole.

Table 1.Net Official International Reserve Changes,1 1966–70(In millions of U.S. dollars)
1966196719681969197021966–702
Brazil139.0−148.093.0732.0551.01,367.0
Argentina104.1371.964.6−147.2195.4588.8
Chile76.4−27.0116.6201.968.2436.1
Peru−39.1−49.1−4.855.8305.0267.8
Colombia−40.180.471.561.434.4207.6
Mexico27.022.071.05.037.0162.0
Venezuela−66.899.449.912.044.0138.5
Uruguay13.714.555.022.8−29.876.2
Jamaica9.2−2.136.0−2.716.757.1
Guatemala−5.7−6.63.511.015.217.4
Costa Rica−9.9−10.63.347.4−16.913.3
Ecuador11.38.9−11.34.3−0.312.9
Panama1.40.43.0−15.717.06.1
Trinidad and Tobago−0.4−3.533.5−5.2−18.65.8
Paraguay1.0−0.2−0.5−1.55.94.7
Haiti30.3−2.3−0.81.13.82.1
Barbados−3.1−3.56.63.6−4.3−0.7
Honduras4.31.35.9−2.1−11.9−2.5
Bolivia4.9−8.8−0.1−0.2−4.2
El Salvador−13.5−2.04.4−8.014.1−5.0
Guyana−3.5−2.31.8−2.8−3.3−10.1
Nicaragua1.5−18.42.4−3.57.7−10.3
Dominican Republic−22.4−8.913.813.8−8.9−12.6
Region189.6305.5618.3983.21,221.43,318.0

Changes in the net international reserve holdings of the monetary authorities and state banks other than commercial banks.

Excluding the allocation of special drawing rights in 1970.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Changes in the net international reserve holdings of the monetary authorities and state banks other than commercial banks.

Excluding the allocation of special drawing rights in 1970.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

In order to permit cross-country comparisons of their balance of payments performance, it was necessary to adjust for the wide difference in the size of the 23 economies reviewed. The “weight” selected is nominal gross domestic product (GDP) at factor cost—except for Mexico, where GDP at market prices has had to be used—converted into U.S. dollars as a common denominator. The results of this exercise are presented in Table 2, which ranks the 23 countries in descending order of their net international reserve gains as a percentage of their respective GDPs over the entire five-year period. This table shows that the net official international reserve gain of all 23 countries combined represented about 0.6 per cent of GDP for the five years, and that this percentage rose steadily from 0.2 per cent in 1966 to a rather impressive 0.9 per cent in 1970.

Table 2.Net Official International Reserve Changes Relative to Gross Domestic Product,1 1966–70(In per cent of GDP)
1966196719681969197021966–702
Chile1.34−0.451.932.581.051.39
Jamaica1.02−0.223.96−0.271.471.17
Peru−0.85−1.06−0.111.185.681.13
Brazil0.60−0.590.332.271.480.94
Uruguay0.870.963.451.30−1.540.91
Colombia−0.781.511.311.060.530.74
Argentina0.642.290.38−0.831.050.69
Costa Rica−1.72−1.690.486.15−2.020.38
Venezuela−0.881.250.580.130.460.32
Guatemala−0.41−0.450.220.650.830.22
Paraguay0.23−0.04−0.10−0.291.060.19
Ecuador0.990.73−0.860.30−0.020.19
Panama0.210.050.38−1.791.750.15
Trinidad and Tobago−0.05−0.444.40−0.64−2.200.15
Mexico0.120.090.260.020.110.12
Haiti30.07−0.56−0.190.240.790.10
Honduras0.860.241.01−0.35−1.86−0.09
Bolivia0.80−1.26−0.01−0.02−0.11
El Salvador−1.60−0.230.48−0.841.39−0.11
Nicaragua0.09−1.060.13−0.180.37−0.11
Barbados−3.13−3.216.113.08−3.31−0.12
Dominican Republic−2.37−0.901.311.23−0.73−0.24
Guyana−1.73−1.030.87−1.25−1.40−0.92
Region0.190.300.560.810.910.58½

Gross domestic product at factor cost (except in Mexico, where GDP at market prices has been used), converted into U.S. dollars.

Excluding the allocation of special drawing rights in 1970.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Gross domestic product at factor cost (except in Mexico, where GDP at market prices has been used), converted into U.S. dollars.

Excluding the allocation of special drawing rights in 1970.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

II Balance of Payments Performance and Economic Growth

A great deal has been said and written about the relationship between balance of payments and economic growth performance and objectives, virtually all of it based on a priori reasoning. Two opposing views have been advanced. There are those who claim a good balance of payments performance can, as a rule, be achieved only with the pursuit of policies tending to discourage output, and hence economic growth. The other school of thought maintains that growth of output and a good balance of payments performance are perfectly compatible.

An attempt has been made within this study to validate either of these two opposing views on the strength of empirical evidence. The analysis of the performance of the 23 countries over five years yielded 115 observations, and the averages for the period as a whole yielded an additional set of 23 observations. The definition of the balance of payments performance used has already been explained, i.e., the ratios of net official international reserve changes to GDP, and the measure of the economic growth performance used was percentage changes in per capita real GDP. An attempt was made to correlate these two variables, but no correlation was found.

The absence of a correlation would indicate a more complex relationship between balance of payments performance and economic growth. Growth is likely to be associated with a strong balance of payments performance when such a performance is the result of a rapid export expansion. Imports may also accelerate in these circumstances but their expansion will probably lag behind that of exports, at least for the time being, permitting in this process a foreign reserve accumulation. A sustained rise in the inflow of development capital will have a similar effect on growth but its initial impact on foreign reserves will depend on the import component. Associated construction outlays will obviously contribute to growth, although the income thus generated will lead to a second-round increase in imports. The subsequent increase in productive capacity will clearly raise output, income, and expenditures. The final balance of payments outcome will depend on a number of factors, e.g., whether output is directed toward exports or the domestic market. At the other end of the spectrum, a weak growth performance may be associated with a good balance of payments result if the foreign reserve gain is attained by compressing import demand through restrictive domestic policies.

Even though no simple statistical relationship was found between the ratios of net official international reserve changes to GDP and percentage changes in per capita real GDP, a classification of the performance of the 23 countries on both counts over the five-year period as a whole is presented in Table 3. This classification grades the performance as “strong,” “indifferent,” and “weak.” A “strong” balance of payments performance has been defined as one with a surplus greater than ¼ of 1 per cent of GDP; an “indifferent” balance of payments performance as one ranging between a surplus equal to ¼ of 1 per cent of GDP and a deficit of the same size; and a “weak” balance of payments performance as one with a deficit greater than ¼ of 1 per cent of GDP. An “indifferent” economic growth performance has been defined as an annual per capita real GDP gain ranging between 0 and 2 per cent; a “strong” economic growth record as any per capita real GDP gain of more than 2 per cent a year; and a “weak” economic growth record as any reduction in per capita real GDP. On the basis of this classification, Table 3 groups the 23 countries into various combinations of performance on the two counts. This table shows that over the five years 4 countries had what are judged to be “strong” balance of payments and economic growth performances; 5 countries had a “strong” balance of payments but an “indifferent” economic growth record; 6 countries had the reverse experience, that is, an “indifferent” balance of payments but a “strong” economic growth performance; another 6 countries had an “indifferent” record on both counts; one country had an “indifferent” balance of payments and a “weak” economic growth performance; and one country had the reverse experience, that is, a “weak” balance of payments but an “indifferent” economic growth record. It is perhaps worth noting that, on the definitions used, there were no examples of three possible combinations—i.e., a “strong” balance of payments but a “weak” economic growth performance; of the reverse, i.e., a “strong” economic growth but a “weak” balance of payments performance; or of a “weak” performance on both counts.

Table 3.Comparison of Balance of Payments and Economic Growth Performances, 1966–70(In per cent)
Ratio of Net OfficialAverage Annual Per Capita
International Reserve Change to GDPReal GDP Change
Region0.58½2.8
“Strong” balance of payments performance“Strong” economic growth record
Brazil0.944.5
Colombia0.742.5
Argentina0.692.3
Costa Rica0.384.0
“Strong” balance of payments performance“Indifferent” economic growth record
Chile1.390.6
Jamaica1.171.9
Peru1.130.1
Uruguay0.910.4
Venezuela0.320.6
“Indifferent” balance of payments performance“Strong” economic growth record
Panama0.153.9
Trinidad and Tobago0.152.2
Mexico0.123.5
Bolivia−0.113.2
Barbados−0.124.0
Dominican Republic−0.243.3
“Indifferent” balance of payments performance“Indifferent” economic growth record
Guatemala0.221.8
Paraguay0.190.9
Ecuador0.191.2
Honduras−0.091.8
El Salvador−0.111.0
Nicaragua−0.111.0
“Indifferent” balance of payments performance“Weak” economic growth record
Haiti10.10−0.7
“Weak” balance of payments performance“Indifferent” economic growth record
Guyana−0.921.0

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

III. The Capacity to Import

The concept of capacity to import has been used in this paper to encompass all balance of payments receipts and payments over which national authorities are assumed to have only limited control. More concretely, this concept has been defined as the sum of all balance of payments flows with the exceptions of (a) the part of merchandise import payments that reflects a variation in the import volume; (b) short-term capital movements (including errors and omissions); and (c) international reserve changes. Changes in the capacity to import of Latin America and the Caribbean over the five-year period 1966–70 are examined below under five separate headings—(1) changes in export volume; (2) changes in the terms of trade; (3) changes in the service and transfer account; (4) changes in long-term and medium-term capital flows; and (5) special factors.

Changes in export volume

Latin America and the Caribbean experienced a marked growth of export volume over the five-year period under review, particularly in 1968 and 1969. This growth of export volume was the most important factor by far in the region’s rather impressive gain of capacity to import, accounting as it did for 84 per cent of this gain. In absolute terms, the area’s annual exports at 1965 prices averaged over the five years some $1.4 billion, or 13 per cent, higher than in 1965, and the increase was progressive, reaching more than $2.4 billion in 1970.

The performance of the individual countries is presented in Table 4, which ranks them in descending order of their percentage gain of export volume, in relation to 1965, over the five years. This table shows 4 smaller countries—Costa Rica, Bolivia, Guatemala, and Honduras—as having had the highest rates of export expansion. In all, 20 countries registered gains, and 3 countries—Paraguay, Haiti, and Uruguay—suffered losses.

Table 4.Export Volume Changes in Relation to 1965 1(In millions of U.S. dollars in 1965 prices)
Percentage
Change
from 1965
Averageto Average
196619671968196919701966–701966–701966–70
Costa Rica22.745.285.193.9106.5353.470.763.3
Bolivia23.753.458.964.052.1252.150.443.6
Guatemala53.527.557.584.989.0312.462.533.3
Honduras16.229.158.253.145.2201.840.431.5
Brazil216.6125.6401.6715.7725.62,185.1437.027.4
Peru80.991.5181.4222.2360.1936.1187.227.3
Trinidad and Tobago23.457.065.859.835.8241.848.425.1
Panama7.312.516.531.631.199.019.821.4
El Salvador2.635.148.141.940.9168.633.717.9
Chile32.776.0101.1155.4165.0530.2106.015.3
Colombia−37.755.9100.9151.2133.0403.380.713.7
Dominican Republic−3.615.67.314.143.276.615.312.2
Guyana2.411.710.616.718.660.012.011.6
Ecuador6.521.927.79.526.992.518.510.3
Jamaica8.60.1−7.119.949.070.514.16.5
Nicaragua−7.68.67.311.920.340.58.15.4
Argentina106.2−44.88.184.0193.9347.469.54.7
Venezuela−40.0103.0102.0157.0208.0530.0106.04.3
Mexico11.0−56.0−33.0156.078.0156.031.22.8
Barbados0.52.41.1−0.43.60.72.5
Uruguay−25.2−45.3−10.22.724.4−53.6−10.7−5.6
Haiti2−0.3−6.8−1.0−1.3−3.6−13.0−2.6−6.8
Paraguay−10.7−12.4−13.6−10.2−4.9−51.8−10.4−17.1
Region489.7606.81,274.32,133.62,438.16,942.51,388.512.9

Change in the export volume with respect to 1965 multiplied by the 1965 export value.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Change in the export volume with respect to 1965 multiplied by the 1965 export value.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Brazil’s export volume growth was the largest in absolute terms—its average annual export volume in this period was $437 million above its 1965 level. It reflected volume growth in such traditional export items as coffee, cotton, and cocoa, as well as in a number of new manufactured products. A marked growth of production for export of minerals was the major dynamic element in Bolivia (tin), Chile (copper), and Peru (copper, iron ore, lead, and zinc), and the latter also benefited from a growth of fish meal and coffee exports. Sharp rises in exports of bananas and coffee highlighted the export growth of Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras. At the other end of the spectrum, it was mainly reduced coffee exports from Haiti and a decline in meat shipments from Paraguay that caused these two countries to suffer losses of export volume in this period.

Changes in terms of trade

The terms of trade did not favor Latin America and the Caribbean during the five years under review. A small initial improvement in 1966 was followed by fairly sharp reversals in 1967 and again in 1968, and although there was a major recovery in 1969 and a further, albeit a smaller one, in 1970, the changes in the terms of trade cost the region a loss of capacity to import of $665 million over the five years.

The performance of the individual countries is presented in Table 5 which ranks them in descending order of their percentage gain from changes in their terms of trade measured against 1965. Only 6 countries—Chile, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Mexico—registered gains over the period under review. The other 17 suffered losses, and the heaviest losses among them were suffered by El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Venezuela.

Table 5.Effect of Terms of Trade Changes in Relation to 1965 1(In millions of U.S. dollars)
Percentage
Change
from 1965
Averageto Average
196619671968196919701966–701966–701966–70
Chile146.784.2109.9232.3164.5737.6147.522.4
Peru96.2105.6120.2208.4269.6800.0160.022.0
Dominican Republic11.19.320.625.313.780.016.012.4
Uruguay24.86.4−10.819.220.660.212.07.1
Paraguay7.96.74.31.820.74.16.7
Mexico41.422.7101.682.988.2336.867.45.0
Jamaica−1.32.5−6.6−8.6−12.4−26.4−5.3−2.1
Bolivia−1.0−6.5−12.1−7.49.1−17.9−3.6−2.8
Guyana3.02.9−6.0−6.3−8.8−15.2−3.0−2.9
Panama0.5−2.91.2−7.1−15.3−23.6−4.7−3.1
Barbados−1.0−2.7−3.8−7.5−1.5−3.1
Trinidad and Tobago8.1−3.5−11.6−12.3−2Ó.8−40.1−8.0−3.7
Argentina−32.3−22.9−146.7−41.7−82.1−325.7−65.1−4.8
Haiti2−1.5−0.6−3.6−4.3−0.7−10.7−2.1−4.9
Nicaragua−4.0−11.0−3.2−16.1−11.7−46.0−9.2−6.0
Brazil−78.1−102.3−161.5−76.7−84.8−503.4−100.7−7.5
Colombia−18.4−85.6−77.2−49.431.5−199.1−39.8−7.6
Honduras−4.0−5.6−10.9−17.5−14.8−52.8−10.6−8.4
Ecuador−6.3−14.1−17.5−27.8−10.7−76.4−15.3−8.8
Guatemala−14.4−17.7−21.5−26.5−15.9−96.0−19.2−9.2
Venezuela−111.9−167.8−197.8−291.7−277.7−1,046.9−209.4−10.5
Costa Rica−3.2−17.1−26.9−23.8−11.9−82.9−16.6−11.4
El Salvador−9.4−21.3−31.9−41.3−26.0−129.9−26.0−13.3
Region53.9−239.6−390.7−94.25.4−665.2−133.0−1.3

Change in the terms of trade with respect to 1965 multiplied by the 1965 average value of exports and imports.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Change in the terms of trade with respect to 1965 multiplied by the 1965 average value of exports and imports.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

It was the progressive rise in import prices and not a drop in export prices that was responsible for the adverse behavior of the region’s terms of trade. Table 6 shows only two countries—Uruguay and Peru—as having benefited in the period under review from reduced import prices, but these two apparent exceptions from the general experience of the region may well reflect shortcomings in the statistics used. The rise in import prices appears to have cost the region almost $2.7 billion over the five-year period, and more than $1.1 billion in 1970 alone. Venezuela suffered the largest absolute loss on this account—some $700 million in the five years—followed by Brazil with close to $500 million.

Table 6.Effect of Import Price Changes in Relation to 1965 1(In millions of U.S. dollars)
Percentage
Change
from 1965
Averageto Average
196619671968196919701966–701966–701966–70
Uruguay3.5−7.0−8.510.713.011.72.31.6
Peru−23.220.920.918.54.641.78.31.1
Bolivia5.26.41.0−4.2−10.2−1.8−0.4−0.3
Chile13.1−11.915.0−16.3−34.4−34.5−6.9−1.1
Colombia−14.2−14.2−18.4−46.8−9.4−2.0
Paraguay3.03.70.6−5.5−8.5−6.7−1.3−2.1
Mexico−4.7−40.6−25.0−42.1−120.1−232.5−46.5−3.0
Argentina−24.0−34.8−26.4−65.9−140.2−291.3−58.3−4.9
Guatemala−7.3−8.0−14.0−23.6−32.8−85.7−17.1−7.5
Dominican Republic−4.2−4.6−8.1−13.6−18.9−49.4−9.9−7.5
Nicaragua−5.1−5.6−9.8−16.5−22.9−59.9−12.0−7.5
Costa Rica−5.7−6.3−10.9−18.4−25.6−66.9−13.4−7.5
Honduras−4.0−4.3−7.6−12.8−17.7−46.4−9.3−7.5
El Salvador−6.5−7.1−12.4−20.9−29.0−75.9−15.2−7.5
Haiti2−1.5−1.7−2.9−4.9−6.8−17.8−3.6−7.5
Panama−6.4−12.3−14.1−22.9−33.5−89.2−17.8−8.6
Jamaica−9.0−11.8−26.9−38.1−41.3−127.1−25.4−8.8
Brazil−21.9−43.9−76.7−65.8−285.1−493.4−98.7−9.0
Venezuela−60.6−106.0−136.3−181.7−212.0−696.6−139.3−9.2
Trinidad and Tobago−7.6−10.1−22.8−32.4−46.8−119.7−23.9−9.7
Guyana−3.3−4.3−9.8−13.9−20.2−51.5−10.3−9.8
Barbados−2.1−2.8−6.3−8.9−12.9−33.0−6.6−9.8
Ecuador−5.7−13.8−21.3−30.2−36.8−107.8−21.6−12.8
Region−178.0−320.1−416.5−609.4−1,156.5−2,680.5−536.1−5.5

Change in import prices with respect to 1965 multiplied by the 1965 import value.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Change in import prices with respect to 1965 multiplied by the 1965 import value.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

During the five-year period, the region recovered 70 per cent of its loss from rising import costs through better export prices, and there was even a small positive balance in 1970. In all, 15 countries were in varying degrees favored by this compensation. Table 7 shows countries exporting minerals—Chile, Peru, Mexico, Jamaica, and Guyana—as among the principal beneficiaries from higher export prices. Peru, which together with Chile was favored by record copper prices, was also able to sell its fish meal at good prices. The Dominican Republic fared well, notwithstanding depressed sugar prices through 1968, because it was able to shift its sugar exports increasingly to the higher priced U.S. market. In 1968 Argentina suffered a sharp drop in meat prices, but subsequently recovered much of the resultant loss when prices rose again. Venezuela was adversely affected by a severe decline of petroleum prices in 1966 and their continuing weakness during the remainder of the period. Brazil, Colombia, and Central America were hit by weak coffee prices through 1968, but the situation improved in 1969 and 1970. The effects of these fluctuations in coffee prices were in several producing countries aggravated by the somewhat similar pattern followed by banana prices.

Table 7.Effect of Export Price Changes in Relation to 1965 1(In millions of U.S. dollars)
Percentage
Change
from 1965
Averageto Average
196619671968196919701966–701966–701966–70
Chile136.889.896.7267.4220.4811.1162.223.5
Dominican Republic15.213.829.040.033.1131.126.220.9
Peru113.077.491.7173.9246.5702.5140.520.5
Paraguay4.32.43.65.510.926.75.38.7
Mexico37.947.9103.6101.4164.9455.791.18.2
Jamaica5.611.014.020.028.679.215.87.3
Guyana6.37.23.26.69.432.76.56.3
Trinidad and Tobago13.34.66.813.315.153.110.65.5
Uruguay22.816.8−1.96.34.248.29.65.0
Panama3.13.67.15.44.023.24.65.0
Haiti2−0.23.0−1.0−0.34.76.21.23.1
Ecuador−0.5−1.12.3−1.626.025.15.02.8
Barbados0.90.50.91.23.50.72.5
Nicaragua0.9−5.55.8−1.98.27.51.51.0
Brazil−62.2−62.2−92.5287.270.314.10.9
Argentina−6.016.4−132.932.973.2−16.4−3.3−0.2
Honduras−1.3−3.8−6.51.3−10.3−2.1−1.6
Venezuela−44.7−49.6−44.7−84.4−44.7−268.1−53.6−2.2
Bolivia−5.0−10.6−11.4−3.516.7−13.8−2.8−2.4
Guatemala−7.3−10.0−9.0−6.910.5−22.7−4.5−2.4
Costa Rica1.1−9.7−15.2−8.75.5−27.0−5.4−4.8
Colombia−20.7−81.0−70.9−55.660.9−167.3−33.5−5.7
El Salvador−3.2−14.7−21.1−24.3−1.7−65.0−13.0−6.9
Region211.448.7−39.7480.21,184.91,885.5377.13.5

Change in export prices with respect to 1965 multiplied by the 1965 export value.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Change in export prices with respect to 1965 multiplied by the 1965 export value.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Changes on service and transfer account

The service and transfer account also had a negative impact on the region’s capacity to import merchandise in the period under review. The loss on this account amounted to $860 million over the period, and there was no discernible pattern in the year-to-year fluctuations.

Table 8 ranks the countries in descending order of their percentage gain on this account, in relation to 1965, over the five years. This table shows Haiti, Paraguay, and Jamaica as having had the best experiences on this score, and El Salvador, Trinidad and Tobago, Bolivia, and Guyana as having had the worst. Since the service and transfer account includes a great variety of international transactions, it is hazardous to draw any sweeping inferences from these calculations. It would seem, however, that countries with relatively large tourist earnings—such as Haiti, Jamaica, Barbados, and Mexico—were able to improve their service and transfer account and that countries with relatively high factor income payments abroad did not suffer any noticeable deterioration in this account.

Table 8.Changes on Service and Transfer Account in Relation to 1965(In millions of U.S. dollars)
Percentage
Change
from 1965
Averageto Average
196619671968196919701966–701966–701966–70
Haiti111.415.212.715.222.476.915.4405.3
Paraguay3.53.93.86.37.224.74.9245.0
Jamaica31.013.434.032.245.7156.331.3145.6
Barbados8.46.313.412.017.257.311.556.9
Panama22.731.552.027.984.5218.643.751.7
Costa Rica1.6−25.4−1.833.5−6.61.30.337.5
Mexico24.029.057.062.075.0247.049.431.3
Colombia32.0−14.974.537.113.1141.828.422.9
Chile−8.1−70.794.1−10.926.530.96.210.1
Venezuela−119.254.0−86.5−48.4131.6−68.5−13.7−1.5
Peru−43.11.7−66.3−26.890.4−44.1−8.8−11.4
Guatemala−14.1−4.5−7.51.65.9−18.6−3.7−24.2
Argentina−40.9−18.4−41.5−83.8−51.0−235.6−47.1−26.8
Nicaragua2.90.9−9.4−10.4−6.9−22.9−4.6−36.5
Brazil−63.322.1−60.2−176.1−338.8−616.3−123.3−57.3
Ecuador−2.6−11.4−35.3−25.4−67.9−142.6−28.5−57.3
Uruguay1.3−19.2−23.0−17.0−30.1−88.0−17.6−66.4
Honduras0.4−7.3−17.2−6.1−10.2−40.4−8.1−81.8
Dominican Republic−13.0−14.1−6.8−11.0−16.2−61.1−12.2−89.7
Guyana−8.6−9.4−10.3−12.2−9.3−49.8−10.0−100.0
Bolivia−18.7−29.0−28.7−19.1−95.5−19.1−205.4
Trinidad and Tobago−19.5−58.0−54.9−69.0−78.7−280.1−56.0−361.3
El Salvador−10.0−8.2−12.0−11.5−13.4−55.1−11.0−785.7
Region−203.2−102.2−120.2−309.5−128.7−863.8−172.8−12.6

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Changes in long-term and medium-term capital flows

Long-term and medium-term capital flows were a distinctly positive factor in the region’s balance of payments performance during the period under review. The improvement on this account in relation to 1965 netted the region $4.2 billion over the five years. Moreover, this improvement was markedly progressive through 1969, and the reversal of this progression in 1970 shown in Table 9 would disappear with the inclusion of the first allocation of special drawing rights. This table ranks the individual countries in descending order of their gain over 1965 on long-term and medium-term capital account measured in relation to their GDP. On this basis, Jamaica heads the list, followed by Guyana and Ecuador. Other countries that registered gains on this account of more than 1 per cent of GDP were Honduras, Colombia, Paraguay, Nicaragua, and Mexico. In all, 17 countries of the region registered gains. Only 6 suffered losses, with 3—Trinidad and Tobago, the Dominican Republic, and Peru—having suffered losses of more than 1 per cent of GDP.

Table 9.Changes in Long-Term and Medium-Term Capital Flows in Relation to 1965(In millions of U.S. dollars)
1966–70
Change as
AveragePercentage
196619671968196919701966–701966–70of GDP
Jamaica63.171.2116.888.7130.3470.194.09.61
Guyana7.415.64.07.111.445.59.14.17
Ecuador16.915.935.645.098.6212.042.43.16
Honduras−0.32.717.315.331.966.913.42.33
Colombia76.556.7115.9184.8156.2590.1118.02.09
Paraguay5.08.710.612.1−1.035.47.11.45
Nicaragua15.120.235.417.228.2116.123.21.26
Mexico95.0390.0302.0469.0390.01,646.0329.21.19
Brazil130.091.078.0501.0541.01,341.0268.20.92
Venezuela−43.0−81.0191.0161.0143.0371.074.20.87
Panama1.0−10.9−6.624.023.030.56.10.75
Guatemala−0.811.114.810.016.451.510.30.65
Bolivia−13.4−6.324.222.9−7.320.14.00.51
Uruguay−3.9−2.317.218.612.542.18.40.50
Costa Rica2.3−0.9−6.44.315.514.83.00.42
Barbados3.03.41.10.5−7.01.00.20.18
Chile−1.6−8.410.42.74.67.71.50.03
Haiti1−2.1−2.9−1.9−0.44.7−2.6−0.5−0.12
El Salvador10.12.7−5.7−1.4−13.3−7.6−1.5−0.17
Argentina−25.5−174.3−110.8−12.921.4−302.1−60.4−0.35
Peru13.43.6−74.9−55.8−183.1−296.8−59.4−1.25
Dominican Republic−59.6−40.7−18.1−13.122.4−109.1−21.8−2.05
Trinidad and Tobago−37.3−35.5−33.1−31.411.7−125.6−25.1−3.17
Region251.3329.6716.81,469.21,451.14,218.0843.60.74

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Special factors

During this period two cases of mandatory repatriation of nationals’ foreign funds were taken into account in calculating changes in import capacity. The first was Colombia’s in 1967, which is estimated to have yielded about $20 million, and the second was Peru’s in 1970, which is estimated to have yielded $160 million.

Summary

Table 10 shows the combined balance of payments effects of the factors separately reviewed in this section—changes in export volume, changes in the terms of trade, changes on service and transfer account, changes in long-term and medium-term capital flows, and special factors. For the entire region, the gain in import capacity in relation to 1965 amounted to $8.3 billion over the five years. Except for 1967, this gain was progressive, rising to almost $3.4 billion in 1970.

Table 10.Changes in Capacity to Import in Relation to 1965 1(In millions of U.S. dollars)
Percentage
Change
from 1965
Averageto Average
196619671968196919701966–701966–701966–70
Jamaica98.782.2124.5111.6178.7595.7119.145.9
Chile183.097.2337.7451.3415.91,485.1297.045.8
Colombia51.413.12188.3303.3343.9900.02180.0233.9
Mexico163.0365.0395.0747.0543.02,213.0442.633.7
Costa Rica22.1−0.738.592.986.4239.247.833.2
Brazil183.536.9164.0921.1754.42,059.9412.026.3
Panama27.423.253.361.794.9260.552.125.8
Haiti37.34.66.38.720.447.39.525.5
Honduras11.617.441.935.640.6147.129.422.5
Guatemala22.314.337.860.488.7223.544.721.6
Bolivia10.120.938.147.336.9153.330.719.7
Peru48.9100.637.7136.1425.84749.14149.8419.4
Barbados10.59.79.42.01.032.66.511.9
Nicaragua5.717.028.80.126.177.715.510.1
Guyana4.220.8−1.55.610.239.37.97.7
Ecuador13.69.83.3−12.443.157.411.57.5
Paraguay5.06.74.45.41.623.14.66.3
Venezuela−303.2−76.012.5−41.4188.6−219.5−43.9−2.7
Dominican Republic−67.0−30.30.512.456.3−28.1−5.6−2.8
Uruguay−4.2−61.9−26.526.234.3−32.1−6.4−2.9
El Salvador−6.66.0−7.1−19.2−13.1−40.0−8.0−3.7
Argentina11.7−253.0−302.8−60.171.0−533.2−106.6−7.6
Trinidad and Tobago−25.3−38.7−29.9−49.7−54.1−197.7−39.5−16.4
Region473.7384.821,154.22,845.93,394.648,253.22,41,650.62,415.9

For calculation see Table 21. Includes residuals in foreign trade balance after calculated changes in export and import volumes and effects of changes in terms of trade.

Includes an estimated $20 million mandatory return of flight capital in 1967.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Includes an estimated $160 million mandatory return of flight capital in 1970.

For calculation see Table 21. Includes residuals in foreign trade balance after calculated changes in export and import volumes and effects of changes in terms of trade.

Includes an estimated $20 million mandatory return of flight capital in 1967.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Includes an estimated $160 million mandatory return of flight capital in 1970.

The individual countries are ranked in Table 10 in descending order of their percentage gain of import capacity in relation to their 1965 import value. Jamaica heads the list, followed closely by Chile. Both countries increased their capacity to import by more than 45 per cent. Other countries with gains of more than 25 per cent were Colombia, Mexico, Costa Rica, Brazil, Panama, and Haiti. The largest absolute gains were Mexico’s $2.2 billion, Brazil’s $2.1 billion, and Chile’s $1.5 billion in the five years. In all, 17 countries increased their capacity, and only 6—Trinidad and Tobago, Argentina, El Salvador, Uruguay, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela—suffered reductions.

IV. The Demand for Imports

In the preceding section changes in the region’s capacity to import in the period 1966–70 were quantified by major sources. The next step in the analysis is a comparison of the calculated import capacities with actual import levels—in other words, of the demand for imports or rates of import capacity utilization. Since changes in import prices over the period under review were already accounted for as part of the calculated changes in the terms of trade—which, it will be recalled, were treated as one of the factors affecting the capacity to import—the demand for imports is defined here in terms of 1965 prices.

After comparing the demand for imports with the capacity to import, an attempt is made in this section to explain divergences in the behavior of the two in relation to national policies in four separate fields: (1) import taxation; (2) import and exchange restrictions; (3) credit policy; and (4) exchange rate changes.

The region’s import demand increased very rapidly from year to year over the period under review. In absolute terms, the area’s average annual import volume in this period was some $2.2 billion, or more than 22 per cent, above its 1965 level, and the increase reached almost $4 billion in 1970.

The performance of the individual countries is presented in Table 11, which ranks them in descending order of their percentage gain of import volume, in relation to 1965, over the period as a whole. This table shows Brazil as having had the largest import expansion by far, both in relative and absolute terms—average annual imports in this period being about $800 million, or 73 per cent, above their 1965 level. Other countries that had large percentage increases in import demand were the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Chile, and Honduras. In all, 21 countries registered increased import volumes, and only 2—Trinidad and Tobago and Haiti—suffered reductions.

Table 11.Import Volume Changes in Relation to 1965(In millions of U.S. dollars in 1965 prices)
Percentage
Change
from 1965
Averageto Average
196619671968196919701966–701966–701966–70
Brazil370.5506.9896.01,040.11,178.43,991.9798.472.8
Dominican Republic41.155.874.581.8130.3383.576.758.0
Colombia234.039.0189.0252.0365.01,079.0215.847.0
Chile170.7149.3258.2278.5341.81,198.5239.738.4
Honduras22.637.652.245.571.6229.545.937.0
Uruguay12.317.54.666.8109.9211.142.228.9
Paraguay13.615.821.721.59.381.916.426.9
Jamaica28.639.962.998.6137.8367.873.625.5
Bolivia19.536.441.744.542.3184.436.925.3
Panama19.029.041.056.096.0241.048.223.2
Mexico40.0144.0369.0463.0720.01,736.0347.222.3
Barbados6.36.39.318.030.069.914.020.7
Costa Rica−4.37.624.043.598.6169.433.919.0
Ecuador−3.618.448.253.234.4150.630.117.8
Nicaragua16.036.713.70.213.580.116.010.0
Guatemala−14.99.620.622.536.474.214.86.5
Guyana8.719.9−5.2−1.57.729.65.95.6
Peru72.1144.30.2−11.95.0209.742.05.4
Argentina−96.3−134.0−54.6295.3305.4315.863.25.3
Venezuela−97.0−85.0115.0111.0244.0288.057.63.8
El Salvador11.914.41.3−10.6−15.11.90.40.2
Haiti1−0.6−4.9−7.4−4.44.0−13.3−2.7−5.7
Trinidad and Tobago−24.6−44.9−64.0−44.3−31.9−209.7−42.0−17.1
Region845.61,059.62,111.92,919.33,934.410,870.82,174.222.3

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

More relevant to the present analysis is a country-by-country comparison of changes in import demand in relation to changes in capacity to import—in other words, the degree of underutilization or over-utilization of import capacity. These comparisons are shown in Table 12, which ranks the individual countries in ascending order of the percentage increase, in relation to 1965, in the rate of utilization of their import capacity over the five-year period. In these comparisons no change in relation to 1965 implies that a country’s policies—in the fields of import taxation, import and exchange restrictions, credit policy, and exchange rate policy—caused a change in import demand equal to the change in its capacity. A positive change signifies that the country overimported, while a negative change indicates that it did not use the change in its import capacity fully. In all, 11 countries reduced the rate of utilization of their capacity to import, and 12 countries increased their rate of utilization. Haiti shows the largest reduction of almost 25 per cent, followed a considerable distance behind by Jamaica with a reduction of about one third less than Haiti’s. At the other end of the spectrum, the Dominican Republic had the highest rate of acceleration of import capacity utilization—with 62½ per cent—followed by Brazil with 37 per cent and Uruguay with 33 per cent.

Table 12.Indices of Utilization of Capacity to Import1
Percentage
Change
from 1965
to Average
1965196619671968196919701966–701966–70
Haiti2128.2105.8102.492.694.389.896.5−24.7
Jamaica111.388.696.291.6104.497.495.7−14.0
Guatemala110.793.5107.9102.094.189.897.0−12.4
Peru100.1102.9105.195.483.864.988.4−11.7
Costa Rica124.0104.9129.9111.093.8120.3110.8−10.6
Mexico118.6108.3101.4112.898.1122.7108.5−8.5
Chile96.395.6103.889.582.190.891.4−5.1
Panama102.998.9105.297.5100.1102.4100.8−2.0
Guyana102.5106.6101.498.995.9100.1100.6−1.9
Trinidad and Tobago101.8102.499.185.9105.1114.2101.0−0.8
Nicaragua104.2110.5115.395.3104.396.6104.1−0.1
EI Salvador94.4103.298.498.398.393.198.34.1
Bolivia93.499.5102.996.593.697.597.84.7
Venezuela94.5109.193.6100.9104.198.2100.86.7
Barbados123.6113.3114.8120.0151.0175.2133.37.8
Ecuador109.798.7114.4138.1157.0103.2120.39.7
Colombia86.5119.191.690.285.394.295.09.8
Honduras94.9103.1109.2102.1102.0114.3106.211.9
Argentina85.277.792.3103.6110.9101.897.013.8
Paraguay83.996.096.7107.3105.694.6100.119.3
Uruguay65.572.4101.676.785.599.587.032.8
Brazil69.983.799.9115.085.897.995.736.9
Dominican Republic65.0127.0108.6101.499.2101.1105.662.5
Region93.697.3100.1102.595.599.198.85.6

Ratio of import volume to capacity to import.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Ratio of import volume to capacity to import.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Notwithstanding its ranking among the top three in terms of acceleration since 1965 of its rate of import capacity utilization, Uruguay still had the lowest absolute utilization rate—with 87 per cent—followed by Peru with 88 per cent and Chile with 91 per cent. Other countries with low but appreciably increased utilization rates were Brazil and Colombia. Barbados had the highest absolute utilization rate with more than 133 per cent, followed by Ecuador with 120 per cent and Costa Rica with 111 per cent. Costa Rica’s still appreciable rate of over-utilization had come down from its 1965 level, but Barbados and Ecuador had widened further their margins of overutilization.

The region’s utilization rate of its import capacity was about 5½ per cent higher in 1966–70, both on the average and in 1970, than it had been in 1965, but it still retained a small margin of underutilization of capacity—about 1 per cent—over the five-year period as well as in 1970. In assessing these results, it is, however, important to bear in mind that a 100 per cent rate of utilization of import capacity, by definition, precludes any international reserve gain, save for inflows of short-term funds and allocations of special drawing rights. As a matter of policy, some countries may, therefore, feel constrained to hold the rate of import capacity utilization below the 100 per cent level, if not in every year, then at least over a period of the length of the one examined here.

Changes in import taxation

Table 13 presents a measurement of the weight of import taxation in Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of annual ratios of import tax yields to c.i.f. import values, a measuring technique that has the drawback of concealing the effect of import tax rates that are prohibitive. The table ranks the individual countries in descending order of the weight of their import taxation over the period under review. It reveals that, with only a few exceptions, this weight has not changed significantly between 1965 and the average for 1966–70. The exceptions were Uruguay, where import taxation increased significantly, and Honduras, Argentina, Paraguay, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua, where it diminished appreciably. In Brazil the weight of this taxation dropped sharply from 1966 to 1967, but again became more important in 1968. For the region as a whole, the weight of import taxation declined by about 1½ percentage points. One has to conclude, therefore, that changes in import taxation probably did not contribute significantly to changes in intensity of import capacity utilization.

Table 13.Ad Valorem Weights of Import Taxation(In per cent of c.i.f. import value)
Average
1965196619671968196919701966–70
Ecuador36.538.343.039.438.934.538.7
Dominican Republic35.840.336.135.037.732.135.8
Paraguay41.431.329.626.626.927.228.2
Peru24.124.123.224.727.227.025.1
Haiti118.218.920.524.123.019.521.1
Uruguay12.521.516.915.317.220.318.3
Argentina26.624.619.016.317.214.617.9
Chile17.217.817.317.419.317.317.8
Jamaica16.015.616.719.019.217.317.7
Bolivia16.716.117.015.815.617.516.4
Colombia16.120.315.814.114.515.616.1
Guyana15.516.515.616.517.514.916.1
Costa Rica19.619.515.612.412.012.313.9
Guatemala15.414.312.111.212.112.012.3
Trinidad and Tobago11.312.412.511.410.911.011.6
Mexico12.411.311.710.99.911.010.9
El Salvador12.411.310.69.810.812.110.9
Brazil11.713.77.411.411.810.010.8
Nicaragua13.411.710.210.19.28.910.0
Barbados9.99.410.59.09.99.89.7
Panama9.69.09.28.68.510.59.2
Honduras13.510.79.59.57.57.48.8
Venezuela6.77.36.96.26.56.76.7
Region15.916.214.013.814.313.514.3

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Changes in exchange and nontariff import restrictions

Extensive systems of exchange and nontariff import restrictions designed to give balance of payments relief are the exception rather than the rule in Latin America and the Caribbean. About two thirds of the countries in the area—15 in all—have eschewed the use of exchange restrictions, multiple exchange rates, and discriminatory currency arrangements as permanent instruments for managing their balances of payments by accepting the regime prescribed by Article VIII of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Most of the countries in the area have no extensive exchange controls at all, and only very few having such controls use them to restrict international payments other than payments for capital transfers, remittances of earnings from foreign investments, or foreign travel of residents. Several countries of the region use restrictive import quotas and prohibitions. In a number of countries—particularly in Mexico, Venezuela, and the Caribbean countries—these devices are being used mainly to protect local industry, and only in a few countries—notably Chile and Colombia—do quantitative import restrictions serve prominently as a substitute for exchange restrictions. Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Uruguay also rely for the latter purpose on advance import deposit requirements.

More relevant to the present analysis than their absolute level of restrictiveness are changes in these restrictive practices during the five years under review. In this respect, only two countries of the region—the Dominican Republic and Peru—had appreciably more restrictive exchange and trade systems at the end of these five years than at the beginning. Payments arrears began to accumulate in the Dominican Republic in mid-1966. The sale of official exchange for certain payments for invisibles was subsequently discontinued and quantitative import restrictions, including prohibitions, were applied to a number of commodities, but the commodities so restricted could continue to be brought in if paid for with the importer’s own exchange. After the Central Reserve Bank of Peru withdrew briefly from the exchange market, this market in October 1967 was split in two—a “certificate” market for all receipts and payments for merchandise trade, all operations of the government and of government entities, and certain current invisibles and capital transactions, and a “draft” market for all other receipts and payments. Access to the “draft” market was initially unrestricted, but in May 1970 the exchange controls previously applicable to the “certificate” market were also extended to the “draft” market. Moreover, the importation of a number of commodities considered nonessential has been prohibited since May 1968.

One country—Haiti—introduced restrictions on current payments in the period under review but dismantled them toward the end of this period. The restrictions began to be applied in mid-1967; they caused a progressive accumulation of payments arrears, but these were paid off before the end of 1970.

In one country in the area—Uruguay—experimentation with new restrictions alternated during the period with liberalization measures. Advance import deposit requirements and special financing rules for imported capital goods were removed in 1968, but basic exchange allowances for certain payments for invisibles were introduced in 1969. On balance, the restrictiveness of Uruguay’s trade and payments system probably remained broadly constant during 1966–70.

Four countries of the area—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Colombia—seem to have de-emphasized their reliance on exchange and nontariff import restrictions during the period under review. Argentina’s case is special in that the early part of this period was characterized by efforts to dismantle restrictions while the end of the period was marked by a trend in the opposite direction. Thus, import prohibitions were eliminated and prior import deposit requirements were lowered in 1966. However, toward the end of the five years, the exchange market was briefly closed and then reopened only gradually, and when it was fully operative again there were certain restrictions on capital movements.

Brazil removed quantitative restrictions from nonessential import commodities in 1966 and kept its exchange system generally free from restrictions throughout the five-year period. Chile’s liberalization process in this period involved the elimination of payments arrears, a major expansion of the list of permitted imports, and a partial dismantling of advance import deposit requirements, but its exchange and trade system still retained major restrictive features even after this liberalization. Colombia’s efforts in the same direction included a broadening of the list of imports exempt from licensing and more liberal policies for imports still subject to licensing, but the practices of this country, too, still remained rather restrictive as the period under review came to a close.

Credit policy

It is generally recognized that domestic financial policy is a powerful tool of balance of payments management. In developing countries, financial policy probably is most accurately represented by changes in the volume of bank credit, which follow rather closely the changing needs for funds both of the public and private sectors and hence reflect fiscal as well as monetary policies. An analysis of the factors that determined the level of import demand would, therefore, be incomplete without some attempt to quantify the role that credit policy had played. However, a measurement of the effects on import demand of a given credit policy is made difficult by the fact that this policy—and the financial policy mix for which it is a proxy—influences not only the balance of payments performance but also domestic prices.

The theoretical framework for the appraisal of credit policy in this paper is the proposition that changes in the stock of bank credit must equal changes in the community’s stock of savings in the form of claims on the banking system generated by real income changes plus or minus changes in the community’s preference for such savings, in order to be consistent with balance of payments equilibrium and domestic price stability; and if domestic prices are to follow the price level in the rest of the world rather than remaining absolutely stable, then the changes in the stock of bank credit will also have to reflect the movement of foreign prices. This framework assumes that credit policy will not influence output in the short run. It is recognized that this assumption is an oversimplification for some of the more advanced countries, but it seems reasonable for the area as a whole. It follows from this proposition that departures from balance of payments equilibrium and disparities between domestic and foreign price movements are to be taken as an indication that the observed change in the stock of bank credit differs from the equilibrium stock. As already mentioned, credit policy can be judged only in terms of its combined effect on these two variables, and this raises the technical problem of devising a combined measurement of balance of payments performance and price movements. The methodology followed here satisfies the need to bring to a common denominator annual balance of payments performances and annual price changes, the former defined in terms of net international reserve movements and the latter as changes in domestic price levels—as a rule, levels of consumer prices—deflated by changes in import prices. International reserve movements and changes in domestic prices relative to those in the rest of the world can both be related to changes in the stock of money and quasi-money. The translation of international reserve movements into changes in the money and quasi-money stock was a straightforward one-to-one proposition, and the price effect was calculated by applying the percentage change of domestic prices relative to import prices during the year to the stock of money and quasi-money at the beginning of the year. The two calculated effects were then added or netted, and this sum or difference was taken to represent domestic bank credit expansions or contractions in excess or short of those that would have been consistent with external and internal equilibrium. These credit excesses or shortfalls were then related to the observed annual changes in bank credit in order to derive indices of credit expansions in excess or short of those that would have been consistent with absolute balance of payments equilibrium and absolute domestic price stability relative to prices in the rest of the world. The methodology just described is illustrated by an example in Table 22 in the Appendix.

The results of these calculations are shown in Table 14, which ranks countries in ascending order of their excess credit expansions so defined over the five years. For what it is worth, the region as a whole appears to have been expanding credit during this period at a rate about 21 per cent beyond the equilibrium point. In all, 12 countries showed up with lower-than-equilibrium rates of credit expansion and 11 countries with higher-than-equilibrium rates.

Table 14.Indices of Credit Expansion in Excess or Short of That Consistent with External and Internal Equilibrium1(Credit expansion consistent with external and internal equilibrium = 100)
196619671968196919701966–70
Haiti2150.0471.490.975.04.275.8
Guatemala101.3139.985.763.437.179.4
Venezuela113.160.084.385.485.982.0
Costa Rica208.8240.593.414.2448.185.0
El Salvador116.9314.365.095.821.786.9
Jamaica137.253.7116.497.287.1
Paraguay142.5109.789.483.465.688.9
Panama85.494.694.1132.184.293.7
Dominican Republic3213.062.659.0107.794.7
Trinidad and Tobago112.1167.14.0113.3136.395.5
Ecuador71.181.7109.695.8110.598.2
Honduras70.495.474.3101.9130.399.7
Nicaragua90.6432.870.0110.243.5105.4
Mexico118.3101.2119.0107.4100.9107.8
Barbados372.71,060.038.692.3213.8114.1
Guyana138.2372.6112.1121.3116.7
Argentina163.399.9131.8133.6129.6129.4
Colombia497.285.496.1133.7113.7131.0
Peru157.533100.741.4131.7
Bolivia155.83112.293.994.9138.0
Brazil3238.0155.2113.267.9148.4
Chile155.3217.6176.655.9176.2148.6
Uruguay31,203.43329.4585.73
Region208.3130.0131.5110.596.0120.9

For calculation see Table 22.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Very high rates of excess credit expansion defying quantification because they occurred in periods when external and internal equilibrium would have called for a credit contraction but an expansion took place.

For calculation see Table 22.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Very high rates of excess credit expansion defying quantification because they occurred in periods when external and internal equilibrium would have called for a credit contraction but an expansion took place.

Haiti had the lowest rate of credit expansion on the definitions used—76 per cent—followed by Guatemala with 79 per cent and Venezuela with 82 per cent. Uruguay had the highest rate of credit expansion—so high that it defies quantification—followed by Chile and Brazil both with 148½ per cent.

There is some convergence between these calculations and the calculations of import capacity utilization presented in Table 12, but the degree of convergence is not impressive. For example, Haiti, Guatemala, and Jamaica followed restrained credit policies and had rates of import capacity utilization that were both low in absolute terms and appreciably reduced in comparison with 1965. At the other end of the spectrum, Barbados, Mexico, and Nicaragua followed fairly expansionary credit policies and had high rates of import capacity utilization, but only Barbados’ capacity utilization rate was higher in this five-year period than in 1965 while Mexico’s and Nicaragua’s were lower. Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina, which also followed expansionary credit policies, had appreciably higher utilization rates in this five-year period than in 1965, but these increased rates still left all three countries with significant margins of underutilization of import capacity.

Examples of divergent results were Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic with restrained credit policies and fairly high rates of import capacity utilization, but only the latter and not the former had a higher utilization rate than in 1965. Paraguay, which also followed restrained credit policies, showed a sharp increase in its rate of utilization over 1965, but its utilization rate over the five-year period was still very closely balanced with its import capacity. Chile, Peru, and Colombia followed expansionary credit policies but had low rates of import capacity utilization. The utilization rates of Peru and Chile were appreciably lower than in 1965 but those of Colombia were significantly higher.

The relationship between credit policy and import capacity utilization is shown in Table 15. This table distinguishes between “restrained,” “reasonably balanced,” and “expansionary” credit policies, and between “underutilization,” “reasonably balanced utilization,” and “overutilization” of import capacity. A “reasonably balanced” credit policy has been defined as a credit expansion that is within 2 per cent above or below that calculated to be consistent with balance of payments equilibrium and stability of the domestic price level relative to that of the rest of the world; any credit expansion smaller than this has been classified as a “restrained” policy, and any credit expansion greater than this as an “expansionary” policy. A “reasonably balanced utilization” of import capacity has been defined as a utilization rate within 2½ per cent of capacity, any rate of utilization lower than 97½ per cent as “underutilization,” and any rate higher than 102½ per cent as “overutilization.”

Table 15.Relationship Between Domestic Financial Policy and Balance of Payments Management, 1966–70
Index of Credit Expansion in
Excess or Short of That
Consistent with ExternalIndex of Import
and Internal EquilibriumCapacity Utilization
Region120.998.8
“Restrained” credit policy“Underutilization” of import capacity
Haiti175.896.5
Guatemala79.497.0
Jamaica87.195.7
“Reasonably balanced utilization”
“Restrained” credit policyof import capacity
Venezuela82.0100.8
El Salvador86.998.3
Paraguay88.9100.1
Panama93.7100.8
Trinidad and Tobago95.5101.0
“Restrained” credit policy“Overutilization” of import capacity
Costa Rica85.0110.8
Dominican Republic94.7105.6
“Reasonably balanced” credit policy“Overutilization” of import capacity
Ecuador98.2120.3
Honduras99.7106.2
“Expansionary” credit policy“Underutilization” of import capacity
Argentina129.497.0
Colombia131.095.0
Peru131.788.4
Brazil148.495.7
Chile148.691.4
Uruguay287.0
“Reasonably balanced utilization”
“Expansionary” credit policyof import capacity
Guyana116.7100.6
Bolivia138.097.8
“Expansionary” credit policy“Overutilization” of import capacity
Nicaragua105.4104.1
Mexico107.8108.5
Barbados114.1133.3

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Very high rate of excess credit expansion defying quantification because external and internal equilibrium would have called for a credit contraction in this period but an expansion took place.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Very high rate of excess credit expansion defying quantification because external and internal equilibrium would have called for a credit contraction in this period but an expansion took place.

These classifications are related to the classification of balance of payments performance presented in Table 3. It will be recalled that an “indifferent” balance of payments performance—one that approximates balance of payments equilibrium—has been defined as one ranging between a surplus equal to ¼ of 1 per cent of GDP and a deficit of the same size. This definition has been carried over into the classification of countries in Table 15 by translating it into a rate of utilization of import capacity that is consistent with approximate balance of payments equilibrium. This has been done by applying the ¼ of 1 per cent of the region’s average annual GDP of $113½ billion over the five years under review to its average annual import capacity of $12 billion in the same period. This yielded a permissible margin of some $285 million above or below the region’s annual average import capacity, which is a margin of utilization of some 2½ per cent above or below the calculated import capacity. Adding to this $285 million margin an allowance of $290 million for the effect of a permissible divergence of 1 per cent per annum of domestic prices from those in the rest of the world—probably the maximum permissible over a five-year period barring an exchange rate adjustment—and relating the sum of the two to the region’s $29 billion average stock of money and quasi-money in the five-year period, one arrives at the 2 per cent permissible margin for credit expansion above or below that consistent with absolute balance of payments equilibrium and absolute stability of domestic prices in relation to those in the rest of the world.

Following this methodology, the conclusion emerges that the financial policy mix yielded the expected balance of payments results in a number of countries of the region, but failed to do so in others.

Exchange rate policy

Exchange rate policy was a powerful tool of balance of payments management in several countries of the region in these five years. In all, 11 countries depreciated their currencies during this period and one country performed a very minor effective appreciation of its currency.

The one currency appreciation occurred in Bolivia at the end of 1967, when the authorities of that county reduced a tax on exchange sales from 2 per cent to 1.6 per cent in order to bring the exchange rate structure within the margins prescribed by the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund.

Five countries—Barbados, Ecuador, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago—depreciated2 their currencies by the straightforward method of adjusting their par values. The 4 Caribbean countries followed the United Kingdom in November 1967 and devalued their currencies by 14.3 per cent to match the adjustment of the pound sterling. Ecuador devalued its currency by 38.9 per cent in August 1970. However, the effective rate of depreciation was smaller than this because Ecuador on that occasion unified the free market with the official one, and the rate in the former used to fluctuate freely in response to market forces and hence was at most times significantly depreciated in relation to the official rate. The price level in Ecuador rose by 35 per cent in the five years under review.

One country—Peru—moved in the opposite direction and split its exchange market after the sol had depreciated. The Central Reserve Bank of Peru withdrew from the then unified exchange market in September 1967, and for a short time allowed the exchange rate to find its own level. It then pegged the rate in October of that year at a level 44.3 per cent more depreciated than the one from which it had withdrawn support. At the same time, the exchange market was split into a “certificate” and a “draft” market, and the rate in the latter was initially allowed to move in response to market forces, but there was growing interference with these forces until the “draft” rate, too, was pegged in mid-May 1970 at a level 12.5 per cent more depreciated than the “certificate” rate. The price level in Peru rose by 57 per cent in the five years under review.

Costa Rica’s exchange market at the beginning of 1967 was split into two—an official and a free market—but these two markets were reunified again before the period under review came to an end. The exchange rate in the official market remained unchanged throughout. The rate in the free market was allowed to move broadly in response to market forces, and it depreciated steadily at first, in the first quarter of 1968 depreciating as much as 25 per cent in relation to the official rate. But then the free market rate appreciated progressively until it approximated the official rate so closely that there was a reunification of the two markets at the end of 1969.

Two countries—Argentina and Uruguay—went through a series of exchange rate adjustments in this period. Argentina performed five adjustments, for a cumulative depreciation of 112.7 per cent. The price level in Argentina, meanwhile, rose by 135 per cent. Uruguay adjusted the exchange rate in early 1966, then allowed it to depreciate from May 1966 until November 1967, and subsequently performed two more exchange rate adjustments. The cumulative depreciation of the peso amounted to 324.4 per cent, and the price level in Uruguay rose by 711 per cent during these five years.

Three countries—Chile, Colombia, and Brazil—used a novel technique, the so-called crawling peg. This technique consists of frequent small adjustments of the exchange rate by act of the monetary authorities. Chile was the first country to adopt this technique in late 1962. Over the period under review, the exchange rate in the “banking” market was depreciated by a cumulative 252 per cent and the rate in the “brokers’” market by a cumulative 240 per cent. The price level in Chile, meanwhile, rose by 218 per cent.

Colombia adopted this system of exchange rate adjustment in March 1967, and from then until the end of 1970 the peso depreciated by a cumulative 41.7 per cent. However, the effective rate of depreciation was smaller than this, because there was a unification of the exchange system in June 1968, when the depreciating “certificate” rate—the rate in the major market—had moved just about half the indicated distance and had reached the level of the rate in the so-called capital market. The capital market itself had previously undergone a major transformation. Initially, it was a market with a fluctuating exchange rate, but in November 1966 this exchange rate was pegged at its terminal level, which represented an appreciation of 11 per cent in relation to the rate in the free market at the end of 1965. The price level in Colombia rose by 48 per cent during 1966–70.

Brazil adopted the crawling peg in August 1968. From the beginning of 1966 to that time its exchange rate was adjusted three times for a cumulative depreciation of 63.6 per cent. From the adoption of the crawling peg in August 1968 until the end of 1970, the exchange rate was depreciated by a cumulative 36.1 per cent. The cumulative depreciation of the cruzeiro over the full five-year period amounted to 122.2 per cent. The price level in Brazil, meanwhile, rose by 218 per cent.

Summary

To summarize, changes in the weight of import taxation and in the level of restrictiveness of nontariff import and exchange restrictions do not seem to have played major roles in import demand management during the period under review. Besides, the effects of these policy instruments are, at best, very difficult to quantify. Ten countries of the region—Haiti, Guatemala, Venezuela, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Jamaica, Paraguay, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, and Honduras—observed restraint in their domestic financial policies and, by doing so, moderated their demand for imports. Eleven countries—Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago—achieved the same purpose by adjusting their exchange rates. Two countries—Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago—thus, used both policy instruments in this period, and three—Bolivia, Mexico, and Nicaragua—do not seem to have used either to restrain import demand positively.

Following the method used for estimating the intensity of credit restraint, an attempt has been made to quantify also the effects of the exchange rate adjustments during the period. Table 16 shows the calculated effects over the period as a whole, in combination with the effects ascribed to credit policy. This table ranks countries in ascending order of their credit expansions in excess of those consistent with external, but not necessarily with internal, equilibrium. It would have been too difficult to measure exchange rate changes over five separate years, and hence the table gives measurements only for the five-year period 1966–70 as a whole. Since five-year measurements of the effectiveness of credit policy give different results from those given by the sum of the five annual measurements presented in Table 14, these measurements were, for the sake of comparability, recalculated for the whole five-year period and are shown in Table 16 in parentheses. The illustration given in Table 22 in the Appendix may clarify the methodology used.

Table 16.Indices of Combined Effect of Credit and Exchange Rate Policies, 1966–70 1
Credit ExpansionCredit Expansion Consistent
Consistent with Externalwith External and Internal
Equilibrium = 100Equilibrium = 100
Chile73.6(161.9)
Ecuador74.9(98.0)
Jamaica75.3(85.1)
Haiti277.8(77.8)
Guatemala80.6(80.6)
Argentina81.9(134.2)
Trinidad and Tobago82.6(97.2)
Venezuela82.9(82.9)
Costa Rica84.4(84.4)
Peru86.6(149.2)
El Salvador88.6(88.6)
Paraguay91.7(91.7)
Brazil92.6(155.7)
Panama94.8(94.8)
Guyana94.9(117.5)
Dominican Republic96.5(96.5)
Barbados96.7(110.2)
Colombia98.2(127.5)
Honduras100.6(100.6)
Mexico105.1(105.1)
Nicaragua106.1(106.1)
Bolivia137.5(137.5)
Uruguay33
Region96.8(138.8)

For calculation see Table 22.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Very high rate of excess credit expansion defying quantification because a credit expansion took place when external equilibrium would have called for a contraction.

For calculation see Table 22.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Very high rate of excess credit expansion defying quantification because a credit expansion took place when external equilibrium would have called for a contraction.

What is perhaps most striking about Table 16 is that much of it is an inversion of Table 14, which ranked countries in ascending order of their credit expansions in excess of those consistent with external as well as with internal equilibrium. For example, Chile, which had the second highest rate of excess credit expansion in Table 14, appears in Table 16 as the country with the lowest index of expansion. Other countries that are ranked differently in the two tables are Argentina, Brazil, and Peru. Another interesting observation is that 7 of the 11 countries that adjusted their exchange rates in this five-year period seem to have more than compensated by this action for any credit expansion that was inconsistent with combined external and internal equilibrium. Three countries—Ecuador, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago—had no need to compensate. Uruguay alone did not manage to compensate with exchange rate action the excesses in its credit policies.

Finally, a comment on the relative importance of credit and exchange rate policy in this period seems to be in order. The countries that followed restrained credit policies were, by and large, the smaller ones, while all the larger ones, except Mexico, followed active exchange rate policies, some of them quite extensively. Because of the weight that these countries have, exchange rate policy emerges as the most powerful instrument of balance of payments management for the region as a whole during the period reviewed. This becomes evident with striking clarity from the sharp contrast between the region’s markedly excessive credit expansion in terms of the combined dictates of external and internal equilibrium, and the not insignificant shortfall from the equilibrium level dictated by external considerations alone.

Table 17 shows the relationship between the combination of domestic financial and exchange rate policies and balance of payments management, just as Table 15 showed the relationship between domestic financial policy alone and balance of payments management. The classification used in Table 17 is “active,” “neutral,” and “passive” policies, and this classification follows the same criteria as the ones used in Table 15 for distinguishing between “restrained,” “reasonably balanced,” and “expansionary” credit policies. To round out the picture, Table 17 also shows short-term capital movements and net international reserve changes in terms of equivalents of import capacity utilization rates.

Table 17.Relationship Between Combination of Domestic Financial and Exchange Rate Policies and Balance of Payments Management, 1966–70
Net
International
Short-TermReserve
CapitalGains or
Index of CreditMovementsLosses
Expansion in Excess oras(–) as
Short of ThatPercentagePercentage
Consistent WithIndex of Importof Importof Import
External EquilibriumCapacity UtilizationCapacityCapacity
Region96.898.84.35.5
“Underutilization”
“Active” policyof import capacity
Chile73.691.40.69.2
Jamaica75.395.7−1.33.0
Haiti177.896.5−2.60.9
Guatemala80.697.0−1.71.4
Argentina81.997.06.19.1
Peru86.688.4−5.85.8
Brazil92.695.79.613.9
“Reasonably balanced utilization”
“Active” policyof import capacity
Trinidad and Tobago82.6101.01.60.6
Venezuela82.9100.82.61.8
El Salvador88.698.3−2.2−0.5
Paraguay91.7100.11.31.2
Panama94.8100.81.30.5
Guyana94.9100.6−1.2−1.8
“Overutilization”
“Active” policyof import capacity
Ecuador74.9120.321.91.6
Costa Rica84.4110.812.11.4
Dominican Republic96.5105.64.3−1.3
Barbados96.7133.333.0−0.2
“Underutilization”
“Neutral” policyof import capacity
Colombia98.295.00.85.8
“Overutilization”
“Neutral” policyof import capacity
Honduras100.6106.25.9−0.3
“Underutilization”
“Passive” policyof import capacity
Uruguay287.0−6.07.0
“Reasonably balanced utilization”
“Passive” policyof import capacity
Bolivia137.597.8−2.6−0.5
“Overutilization”
“Passive” policyof import capacity
Mexico105.1108.510.41.8
Nicaragua106.1104.12.9−1.2

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Very high rate of credit expansion defying quantification because a credit expansion took place when external equilibrium would have called for a contraction.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Very high rate of credit expansion defying quantification because a credit expansion took place when external equilibrium would have called for a contraction.

V. Short-Term Capital Movements

Table 18 presents changes from 1965 in short-term capital movements, including errors and omissions, during 1966–70. This table ranks the countries of the region in descending order of the changes in relation to GDP over this five-year period. On this basis, Uruguay had the largest positive change in short-term capital flows, followed by the Dominican Republic and Barbados. Haiti, Guyana, and Guatemala, in this order, suffered the largest reversals on this account. The region as a whole registered a gain on short-term capital account of $3.6 billion in relation to 1965. This gain was equivalent to about ⅔ of 1 per cent of the regional GDP.

Table 18.Changes in Short-Term Capital Movements in Relation to 1965(In millions of U.S. dollars)
1966–70
Change as
AveragePercentage
196619671968196919701966–701966–70of GDP
Uruguay111.5175.2167.4144.7127.1725.9145.88.68
Dominican Republic76.868.378.974.356.2354.570.96.67
Barbados−7.3−6.96.519.624.736.67.36.50
Ecuador6.429.845.982.23.3167.633.52.50
Honduras9.515.710.42.013.350.910.21.77
Venezuela130.081.0143.0155.090.0599.0119.81.40
Brazil36.032.0535.0561.0685.01,849.0369.81.27
Paraguay2.21.59.47.26.226.55.31.09
Argentina−183.7311.1133.028.4250.0538.8107.80.63
Colombia97.160.926.8−35.310.1159.631.90.57
El Salvador2.23.610.0−2.29.322.94.60.50
Mexico−46.0−149.095.0−229.0264.0−65.0−13.0−0.05
Panama−4.98.3−7.2−19.320.2−2.9−0.6−0.07
Trinidad and Tobago0.8−9.2−0.10.74.1−3.7−0.7−0.09
Chile24.0−15.0−3.0−11.0−46.0−51.0−10.2−0.16
Nicaragua−6.5−17.0−31.0−21.7−23.2−99.4−19.9−1.08
Bolivia0.2−7.4−10.6−17.1−8.7−43.6−8.7−1.10
Costa Rica−33.01.0−7.91.3−1.4−40.0−8.0−1.14
Peru−25.8−15.3−52.2−102.1−125.7−321.1−64.2−1.35
Jamaica−41.8−25.3−6.53.4−5.1−75.3−15.1−1.54
Guatemala−44.9−13.3−15.7−28.9−39.1−141.9−28.4−1.79
Guyana0.2−4.0−2.7−10.7−6.6−23.8−4.8−2.18
Haiti1−6.7−10.9−13.6−11.1−11.7−54.0−10.8−2.48
Region96.3515.11,110.8591.41,296.03,609.6721.90.64

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Another indication of the significance of short-term capital flows is given in Table 17, where the absolute magnitudes of these flows—rather than their changes from 1965—are presented in relation to import capacity. On this basis, these flows added about 4½ per cent to the region’s capacity to import over the period under review. On this latter measurement, Barbados heads the list with an addition of 33 per cent, followed by Ecuador with 22 per cent and Costa Rica with 12 per cent. Uruguay, which headed the list of beneficiaries from a change since 1965 on the measurement presented in Table 18, still shows up in Table 17 with the greatest absolute encumbrance of its import capacity—one of 6 per cent—followed by Peru with a fractionally smaller percentage encumbrance.

The question regarding short-term capital movements that is most relevant to the present analysis is the extent to which they were or were not induced by national policies, chiefly perhaps by monetary and exchange rate policies. Such a judgment is relevant here because to the extent that short-term capital movements are policy induced they should be treated, in the context of the present analysis, as explaining rates of utilization of import capacity, and to the extent that they are judged to be spontaneous they should be treated as explaining import capacity.

But a judgment of motivation is at least hazardous, and the fact that short-term capital movements are lumped together with errors and omissions—some of which must be ascribed to other balance of payments flows—detracts even more from such evidence as is available. It may, nonetheless, not be too farfetched to speculate that the inflow of sizable short-term funds into Mexico was at least partly induced by its monetary policies, the inflow into Brazil by its exchange rate policy, and the inflow into Costa Rica perhaps by a combination of the two.

VI. Allocation of Special Drawing Rights in 1970

One important balance of payments flow was ignored in the preceding analysis. On January 1, 1970, the International Monetary Fund made a first allocation of special drawing rights to members wishing to participate in this scheme, and this marked the first appearance of deliberately created means of international payment. In all, the International Monetary Fund allocated on that occasion SDR 3,414 million to its membership, each participant receiving 16.8 per cent of its quota.

The decision to link SDR allocations to Fund quotas has aroused much controversy, especially in developing countries, on the ground that this system benefits above all the richest countries which have the largest quotas in the International Monetary Fund.

This study is not an appropriate occasion for entering into this controversy. But this first allocation of SDRs has a certain relevance to this study in that it gave an international reserve cushion to 22 of the 23 countries reviewed—one, Barbados, did not receive any SDR allocation on January 1, 1970 because it was not then a member of the International Monetary Fund—without any effort on their part, and this cushion was by no means insignificant. The 22 countries together received on that occasion SDR 330 million, 9.7 per cent of the global allocation. This allocation represented an addition of 6.8 per cent to their combined gross official holdings of international reserves at the end of 1969, and the percentage increment was, of course, larger—9½ per cent—if measured against their net official holdings of international reserves on the same date. The countries in the region with the largest Fund quotas—Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela—received, of course, the largest SDR allocations in absolute terms, and among themselves, the lion’s share—62 per cent—of the regional allocation. But it was the small countries of the region that derived the greatest benefit in relative terms from this first SDR allocation. For example, Haiti’s gross international reserves at the time were boosted by 81 per cent, Paraguay’s by 24 per cent, and Panama’s by 22 per cent. The country which was least affected in relative terms by the first SDR allocation was Venezuela, a country for which this allocation represented an addition of only about 4½ per cent to its gross international reserves at the time, followed by Uruguay where the increment was less than 5 per cent, and Chile and Jamaica where the reserve gain barely exceeded 5 per cent (Table 19).

Table 19.1970 SDR Allocations and Their Relative Significance
Ratio of 1970 SDR
Gross OfficialAllocation to End
Holdings ofof 1969 Gross
InternationalOfficial Holdings
Reserves at End1970 SDRof International
of 1969AllocationReserves
Million U.S. dollarsPer cent
Argentina578.958.810.2
Brazil988.058.86.0
Mexico662.045.46.9
Venezuela933.042.04.5
Chile413.121.05.1
Colombia257.421.08.2
Peru201.314.37.1
Uruguay196.89.24.7
Trinidad and Tobago72.47.410.2
Jamaica123.16.45.2
Dominican Republic39.35.413.7
Bolivia41.44.911.8
Panama21.14.722.3
Costa Rica29.34.214.3
Ecuador65.04.26.5
El Salvador56.34.27.5
Guatemala74.44.25.6
Honduras30.93.210.4
Nicaragua44.23.27.2
Guyana30.22.58.3
Haiti3.112.580.6
Paraguay10.52.523.8
Region4,871.7330.06.8

As of September 30, 1969.

As of September 30, 1969.

APPENDIX
Table 20.Summary Balances of Payments, 1965–70(In millions of U.S. dollars)
Long-TermServicesInternational
and Medium-andBasicShort-TermReserve
ExportsTerm CapitalImportsTransfersBalanceCapitalMovement
1965
Argentina1,493.489.5−1,198.6−175.9208.4−28.6179.8
Barbados27.86.7−67.620.2−12.912.9
Bolivia115.531.1−145.69.310.33.814.1
Brazil1,595.5188.0−1,096.4−215.1472.0−182.0290.0
Chile691.019.3−625.0−61.224.116.040.1
Colombia591.063.5−459.0−124.071.5−26.145.4
Costa Rica111.733.2−178.7−0.8−34.631.3−3.3
Dominican Republic125.591.6−132.3−13.671.2−62.38.9
Ecuador180.323.3−168.9−49.7−15.02.7−12.3
El Salvador188.724.3−202.51.411.9−9.12.8
Guatemala187.834.6−229.3−15.3−22.224.22.0
Guyana103.39.7−105.6−10.0−2.63.40.8
Haiti138.22.8−47.7−3.8−10.59.6−0.9
Honduras128.312.2−124.0−9.96.6−0.85.8
Jamaica215.422.7−288.921.5−29.310.2−19.1
Mexico1,114.043.0−1,560.0158.0−245.0195.0−50.0
Nicaragua148.917.5−160.3−12.6−6.524.818.3
Panama92.625.0−208.084.5−5.93.8−2.1
Paraguay60.813.8−60.9−2.011.7−4.37.4
Peru684.6164.6−772.6−77.2−0.610.59.9
Trinidad and Tobago193.063.3−245.2−15.5−4.43.9−0.5
Uruguay191.25.1−146.026.576.8−158.1−81.3
Venezuela2,482.030.0−1,514.0−909.688.4−79.09.4
Region10,760.51,014.8−9,737.1−1,374.8663.4−198.2465.2
1966
Argentina1,593.264.0−1,124.0−216.8316.4−212.3104.1
Barbados29.29.7−76.228.6−8.75.6−3.1
Bolivia133.117.7−159.29.30.94.04.9
Brazil1,741.4318.0−1,496.0−278.4285.0−146.0139.0
Chile867.017.7−779.0−69.336.440.076.4
Colombia533.9140.0−693.0−92.0−111.171.0−40.1
Costa Rica135.535.5−180.00.8−8.2−1.7−9.9
Dominican Republic136.732.0−179.0−26.6−36.914.5−22.4
Ecuador186.240.2−171.9−52.32.29.111.3
El Salvador188.934.4−221.3−8.6−6.6−6.9−13.5
Guatemala231.933.8−221.3−29.415.0−20.7−5.7
Guyana112.217.1−117.8−18.6−7.13.6−3.5
Haiti137.70.7−48.67.6−2.62.90.3
Honduras144.511.9−151.3−9.5−4.48.74.3
Jamaica229.885.8−327.352.540.8−31.69.2
Mexico1,163.0138.0−1,605.0182.0−122.0149.027.0
Nicaragua142.232.6−181.9−9.7−16.818.31.5
Panama103.326.0−234.0107.22.5−1.11.4
Paraguay53.618.8−70.81.53.1−2.11.0
Peru788.5178.0−870.0−120.3−23.8−15.3−39.1
Trinidad and Tobago231.326.0−227.4−35.0−5.14.7−0.4
Uruguay185.81.2−154.527.860.3−46.613.7
Venezuela2,398.0−13.0−1,474.0−1,028.8−117.851.0−66.8
Region11,366.91,266.1−10,763.5−1,578.0291.5−101.9189.6
1967
Argentina1,464.5−84.8−1,096.0−194.389.4282.5371.9
Barbados30.810.1−76.926.5−9.56.0−3.5
Bolivia153.424.8−174.0−9.4−5.2−3.6−8.8
Brazil1,654.0279.0−1,738.0−193.02.0−150.0−148.0
Chile882.010.9−789.0−131.9−28.01.0−27.0
Colombia558.3120.2−514.0−138.945.6 234.880.4
Costa Rica143.832.3−192.8−26.2−42.932.3−10.6
Dominican Republic156.650.9−194.7−27.7−14.96.0−8.9
Ecuador201.039.2−202.7−61.1−23.632.58.9
El Salvador207.827.0−224.5−6.83.5−5.5−2.0
Guatemala203.945.7−247.3−19.8−17.510.9−6.6
Guyana123.025.3−130.6−19.4−1.7−0.6−2.3
Haiti132.0−0.1−44.311.4−1.0−1.3−2.3
Honduras156.014.9−167.3−17.2−13.614.91.3
Jamaica226.593.9−342.334.913.0−15.1−2.1
Mexico1,104.0433.0−1,748.0187.0−24.046.022.0
Nicaragua151.737.7−203.9−11.7−26.27.8−18.4
Panama109.214.1−251.0116.0−11.712.10.4
Paraguay50.322.5−72.11.92.6−2.8−0.2
Peru755.1168.2−892.1−75.5−44.3−4.8−49.1
Trinidad and Tobago256.027.8−208.5−73.51.8−5.3−3.5
Uruguay158.72.8−171.47.3−2.617.114.5
Venezuela2,533.0−51.0−1,529.0−855.697.42.099.4
Region11,311.61,344.4−11,210.4−1,477.0−11.42316.9305.5
1968
Argentina1,367.9−21.3−1,169.0−217.4−39.8104.464.6
Barbados29.87.8−84.033.6−12.819.46.6
Bolivia157.155.3−186.0−19.76.7−6.8−0.1
Brazil1,881.3266.0−2,132.0−275.3−260.0353.093.0
Chile903.029.7−862.032.9103.613.0116.6
Colombia608.9179.4−668.0−49.570.80.771.5
Costa Rica170.826.8−215.1−2.6−20.123.43.3
Dominican Republic163.573.5−219.4−20.4−2.816.613.8
Ecuador210.758.9−244.5−85.0−59.948.6−11.3
El Salvador211.718.6−216.2−10.63.50.94.4
Guatemala233.549.4−265.1−22.8−5.08.53.5
Guyana117.413.7−109.7−20.31.10.71.8
Haiti136.20.9−42.88.93.2−4.0−0.8
Honduras180.929.5−187.0−27.1−3.79.65.9
Jamaica221.8139.5−384.555.532.33.736.0
Mexico1,181.0345.0−1,960.0215.0−219.0290.071.0
Nicaragua162.352.9−184.6−22.08.6−6.22.4
Panama117.518.4−266.0136.56.4−3.43.0
Paraguay50.024.4−81.81.8−5.65.1−0.5
Peru842.689.7−751.9−143.536.9−41.7−4.8
Trinidad and Tobago267.930.2−198.0−70.429.73.833.5
Uruguay179.222.3−159.33.545.79.355.0
Venezuela2,537.0221.0−1,776.0−996.1−14.164.049.9
Region11,832.01,731.6−12,362.9−1,495.0−294.3912.6618.3
1969
Argentina1,612.176.6−1,576.0−259.7−147.0−0.2−147.2
Barbados28.67.2−96.932.2−28.932.53.6
Bolivia174.154.0−195.6−19.413.1−13.3−0.2
Brazil2,3112689.0−2,256.0−391.2353.0379.0732.0
Chile1,174.022.0−927.0−72.1196.95.0201.9
Colombia672.4248.3−711.0−86.9122.8−61.461.4
Costa Rica189.737.5−245.132.714.832.647.4
Dominican Republic184.178.5−236.2−24.61.812.013.8
Ecuador188.168.3−261.9−75.1−80.684.94.3
El Salvador202.222.9−211.7−10.13.3−11.3−8.0
Guatemala262.544.6−277.7−13.715.7−4.711.0
Guyana127.716.8−117.8−22.24.5−7.3−2.8
Haiti136.62.4−47.811.42.6−1.51.1
Honduras172.227.5−187.0−16.0−3.31.2−2.1
Jamaica257.2111.4−438.653.7−16.313.6−2.7
Mexico1,385.0512.0−2,078.0220.039.0−34.05.0
Nicaragua158.734.7−177.0−23.0−6.63.1−3.5
Panama131.449.0−293.0112.4−0.2−15.5−15.7
Paraguay55.225.9−89.84.3−4.42.9−1.5
Peru885.0108.8−742.4−104.0147.4−91.655.8
Trinidad and Tobago270.231.9−227.4−84.5−9.84.6−5.2
Uruguay200.323.7−187.39.536.2−13.422.8
Venezuela2,523.0191.0−1,820.0−958.0−64.076.012.0
Region13,201.52,484.0−13,411.2−1,684.3590.0393.2983.2
1970
Argentina1,770.0110.9−1,680.0−226.9−26.0221.4195.4
Barbados37.3−0.3−116.337.4−41.937.6−4.3
Bolivia191.923.8−201.0−9.84.9−4.9
Brazil2,738.9729.0−2,866.0−553.948.0503.0551.0
Chile1,129.023.9−1,020.0−34.798.2−30.068.2
Colombia798.6219.7−857.0−110.950.4−16.034.4
Costa Rica228.948.7−317.0−7.4−46.829.9−16.9
Dominican Republic213.2114.0−300.2−29.8−2.8−6.1−8.9
Ecuador237.0121.9−247.6−117.6−6.36.0−0.3
El Salvador229.111.0−214.2−12.013.90.214.1
Guatemala292.251.0−303.7−9.430.1−14.915.2
Guyana133.021.1−134.9−19.3−0.1−3.2−3.3
Haiti138.97.5−59.118.65.9−2.13.8
Honduras175.244.1−223.6−20.1−24.412.5−11.9
Jamaica299.6153.0−508.267.211.65.116.7
Mexico1,368.0433.0−2,456.0233.0−422.0459.037.0
Nicaragua178.645.7−198.7−19.56.11.67.7
Panama129.048.0−353.0169.0−7.024.017.0
Paraguay66.012.8−80.05.24.01.95.9
Peru1,038.4−18.5−772.913.2420.23−115.2305.0
Trinidad and Tobago246.675.0−254.0−94.2−26.68.0−18.6
Uruguay220.317.6−233.1−3.61.2−31.0−29.8
Venezuela2,642.0173.0−2,004.0−778.033.011.044.0
Region14,401.72,465.9−15,400.5−1,503.5123.631,097.81,221.4
1966–70
Argentina7,807.7145.4−6,645.0−1,115.1193.0395.8588.8
Barbados155.734.5−450.3158.3−101.8101.1−0.7
Bolivia809.6175.6−915.8−49.020.4−24.6−4.2
Brazil10,326.82,281.0−10,488.0−1,691.8428.0939.01,367.0
Chile4,955.0104.2−4,377.0−275.1407.129.0436.1
Colombia3,172.1907.6−3,443.0−478.2178.5229.1207.6
Costa Rica868.7180.8−1,150.0−2.7−103.2116.513.3
Dominican Republic854.1348.9−1,129.5−129.1−55.643.0−12.6
Ecuador1,023.0328.5−1,128.6−391.1−168.2181.112.9
El Salvador1,039.7113.9−1,087.9−48.117.6−22.6−5.0
Guatemala1,224.0224.5−1,315.1−95.138.3−20.917.4
Guyana613.394.0−610.8−99.8−3.3−6.8−10.1
Haiti1181.411.4−242.657.98.1−6.02.1
Honduras828.8127.9−916.2−89.9−49.476.9−2.5
Jamaica1,234.9583.6−2,000.9263.881.4−24.357.1
Mexico6,201.01,861.0−9,847.01,037.0−748.0910.0162.0
Nicaragua793.5203.6−946.1−85.9−34.924.6−10.3
Panama590.4155.5−1,397.0641.1−10.016.16.1
Paraguay275.1104.4−394.514.7−0.35.04.7
Peru4,309.6526.2−4,029.3−430.1536.4 3−268.6267.8
Trinidad and Tobago1,272.0190.9−1,115.3−357.6−10.015.85.8
Uruguay944.367.6−915.644.5140.8−64.676.2
Venezuela12,633.0521.0−8,603.0−4,616.5−65.5204.0138.5
Region62,113.79,292.0−63,148.5−7,737.8699.42, 32,618.63,318.0
Average 1966–70
Argentina1,561.529.1−1,329.0−223.038.679.2117.8
Barbados31.16.9−90.131.7−20.320.2−0.1
Bolivia161.935.1−183.2−9.84.1−4.9−0.8
Brazil2,065.4456.2−2,097.6−338.485.6187.8273.4
Chile991.020.8−875.4−55.081.45.887.2
Colombia634.4181.5−688.6−95.635.7 25.841.5
Costa Rica173.736.2−230.0−0.5−20.623.32.7
Dominican Republic170.869.8−225.9−25.8−11.18.6−2.5
Ecuador204.665.7−225.7−78.2−33.636.22.6
El Salvador207.922.8−217.6−9.63.5−4.5−1.0
Guatemala244.844.9−263.0−19.07.7−4.23.5
Guyana122.718.8−122.2−20.0−0.6−1.4−2.0
Haiti136.32.3−48.511.61.6−1.20.4
Honduras165.825.6−183.2−18.0−9.99.4−0.5
Jamaica247.0116.7−400.252.816.3−4.911.4
Mexico1,240.2372.2−1,969.4207.4−149.6182.032.4
Nicaragua158.740.7−189.2−17.2−7.04.9−2.1
Panama118.131.1−279.4128.2−2.03.21.2
Paraguay55.020.9−78.92.9−0.11.00.9
Peru861.9105.2−805.9−86.0107.3 3−53.753.6
Trinidad and Tobago254.438.2−223.1−71.5−2.03.21.2
Uruguay188.913.5−183.18.928.1−12.915.2
Venezuela2,526.6104.2−1,720.6−923.3−13.140.827.7
Region12,422.71,858.4−12,629.7−1,547.6139.92, 3523.7663.6

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Includes an estimated $20 million mandatory return of flight capital in 1967.

Includes an estimated $160 million mandatory return of flight capital in 1970.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Includes an estimated $20 million mandatory return of flight capital in 1967.

Includes an estimated $160 million mandatory return of flight capital in 1970.

Table 21.Changes in Capacity to Import in Relation to 1965(In millions of U.S. dollars)
TermsLong-TermServicesForeignCapacityActualInternational
Exportofand Medium-andTradetoImportBasicShort-TermReserve
VolumeTradeTerm CapitalTransfersResidualImportVolumeBalanceCapitalMovement
1966
Argentina106.2−32.3−25.5−40.94.211.7−96.3108.0−183.7−75.7
Barbados0.53.08.4−1.410.56.34.2−7.3−3.1
Bolivia23.7−1.0−13.40.810.119.5−9.40.2−9.2
Brazil216.6−78.1130.0−63.3−21.7183.5370.5−187.036.0−151.0
Chile32.7146.7−1.6−8.113.3183.0170.712.324.036.3
Colombia−37.7−18.476.532.0−1.051.4234.0−182.697.1−85.5
Costa Rica22.7−3.22.31.6−1.322.1−4.326.4−33.0−6.6
Dominican Republic−3.611.1−59.6−13.0−1.9−67.041.1−108.176.8−31.3
Ecuador6.5−6.316.9−2.6−0.913.6−3.617.26.423.6
El Salvador2.6−9.410.1−10.00.1−6.611.9−18.52.2−16.3
Guatemala53.5−14.4−0.8−14.1−1.922.3−14.937.2−44.9−7.7
Guyana2.43.07.4−8.64.28.7−4.50.2−4.3
Haiti 1−0.3−1.5−2.111.4−0.27.3−0.67.9−6.71.2
Honduras16.2−4.0−0.30.4−0.711.622.6−11.09.5−1.5
Jamaica8.6−1.363.131.0−2.798.728.670.1−41.828.3
Mexico11.041.495.024.0−8.4163.040.0123.0−46.077.0
Nicaragua−7.6−4.015.12.9−0.75.716.0−10.3−6.5−16.8
Panama7.30.51.022.7−4.127.419.08.4−4.93.5
Paraguay−10.77.95.03.5−0.75.013.6−8.62.2−6.4
Peru80.996.213.4−43.1−98.548.972.1−23.2−25.8−49.0
Trinidad and Tobago23.48.1−37.3−19.5−25.3−24.6−0.70.80.1
Uruguay−25.224.8−3.91.3−1.2−4.212.3−16.5111.595.0
Venezuela−40.0−111.9−43.0−119.210.9−303.2−97.0−206.2130.0−76.2
Region489.753.9251.3−203.2−118.0473.7845.6−371.996.3−275.6
1967
Argentina−44.8−22.9−174.3−18.47.4−253.0−134.0−119.0311.1192.1
Barbados2.4−1.03.46.3−1.49.76.33.4−6.9−3.5
Bolivia53.4−6.5−6.3−18.7−1.020.936.4−15.5−7.4−22.9
Brazil125.6−102.391.022.1−99.536.9506.9−470.032.0−438.0
Chile76.084.2−8.4−70.716.197.2149.3−52.1−15.0−67.1
Colombia55.9−85.656.7−14.9−19.013.1239.0−25.960.935.0
Costa Rica45.2−17.1−0.9−25.4−2.5−0.77.6−8.31.0−7.3
Dominican Republic15.69.3−40.7−14.1−0.4−30.355.8−86.168.3−17.8
Ecuador21.9−14.115.9−11.4−2.59.818.4−8.629.821.2
El Salvador35.1−21.32.7−8.2−2.36.014.4−8.43.6−4.8
Guatemala27.5−17.711.1−4.5−2.114.39.64.7−13.3−8.6
Guyana11.72.915.6−9.420.819.90.9−4.0−3.1
Haiti1−6.8−0.6−2.915.2−0.34.6−4.99.5−10.9−1.4
Honduras29.1−5.62.7−7.3−1.517.437.6−20.215.7−4.5
Jamaica0.12.571.213.4−5.082.239.942.3−25.317.0
Mexico−56.022.7390.029.0−20.7365.0144.0221.0−149.072.0
Nicaragua8.6−11.020.20.9−1.717.036.7−19.7−17.0−36.7
Panama12.5−2.9−10.931.5−7.023.229.0−5.88.32.5
Paraguay−12.46.78.73.9−0.26.715.8−9.11.5−7.6
Peru91.5105.63.61.7−101.8100.6144.3−43.7−15.3−59.0
Trinidad and Tobago57.0−3.5−35.5−58.01.3−38.7−44.96.2−9.2−3.0
Uruguay−45.36.4−2.3−19.2−1.5−61.917.5−79.4175.295.8
Venezuela103.0−167.8−81.054.015.8−76.0−85.09.081.090.0
Region606.8−239.6329.6−102.2−229.8384.8 21,059.6−674.8515.1−159.7
1968
Argentina8.1−146.7−110.8−41.5−11.9−302.8−54.6−248.2133.0−115.2
Barbados1.1−2.71.113.4−3.59.49.30.16.56.6
Bolivia58.9−12.124.2−29.0−3.938.141.7−3.6−10.6−14.2
Brazil401.6−161.578.0−60.2−93.9164.0896.0−732.0535.0−197.0
Chile101.1109.910.494.122.2337.7258.279.5−3.076.5
Colombia100.9−77.2115.974.5−25.8188.3189.0−0.726.826.1
Costa Rica85.1−26.9−6.4−1.8−11.538.524.014.5−7.96.6
Dominican Republic7.320.6−18.1−6.8−2.50.574.5−74.078.94.9
Ecuador27.7−17.535.6−35.3−7.23.348.2−44.945.91.0
El Salvador48.1−31.9−5.7−12.0−5.6−7.11.3−8.410.01.6
Guatemala57.5−21.514.8−7.5−5.537.820.617.2−15.71.5
Guyana10.6−6.04.0−10.30.2−1.5−5.23.7−2.71.0
Haiti 1−1.0−3.6−1.912.70.16.3−7.413.7−13.60.1
Honduras58.2−10.917.3−17.2−5.541.952.2−10.310.40.1
Jamaica−7.1−6.6116.834.0−12.6124.562.961.6−6.555.1
Mexico−33.0101.6302.057.0−32.6395.0369.026.095.0121.0
Nicaragua7.3−3.235.4−9.4−1.328.813.715.1−31.0−15.9
Panama16.51.2−6.652.0−9.853.341.012.3−7.25.1
Paraguay−13.64.310.63.8−0.74.421.7−17.39.4−7.9
Peru181.4120.2−74.9−66.3−122.737.70.237.5−52.2−14.7
Trinidad and Tobago65.8−11.6−33.1−54.93.9−29.9−64.034.1−0.134.0
Uruguay−10.2−10.817.2−23.00.3−26.54.6−31.1167.4136.3
Venezuela102.0−197.8191.0−86.53.812.5115.0−102.5143.040.5
Region1,274.3−390.7716.8−120.2−326.01,154.22,111.9−957.71,110.8153.1
1969
Argentina84.0−41.7−12.9−83.8−5.7−60.1295.3−355.428.4−327.0
Barbados−0.4−3.80.512.0−6.32.018.0−16.019.63.6
Bolivia64.0−7.422.9−28.7−3.547.344.52.8−17.1−14.3
Brazil715.7−76.7501.0−176.1−42.8921.11,040.1−119.0561.0442.0
Chile155.4232.32.7−10.971.8451.3278.5172.8−11.0161.8
Colombia151.2−49.4184.837.1−20.4303.3252.051.3−35.316.0
Costa Rica93.9−23.84.333.5−15.092.943.549.41.350.7
Dominican Republic14.125.3−13.1−11.0−2.912.481.8−69.474.34.9
Ecuador9.5−27.845.0−25.4−13.7−12.453.2−65.682.216.6
El Salvador41.9−41.3−1.4−11.5−6.9−19.2−10.6−8.6−2.2−10.8
Guatemala84.9−26.510.01.6−9.660.422.537.9−28.99.0
Guyana16.7−6.37.1−12.20.35.6−1.57.1−10.7−3.6
Haiti 1−1.3−4.3−0.415.2−0.58.7−4.413.1−11.12.0
Honduras53.1−17.515.3−6.1−9.235.645.5−9.92.0−7.9
Jamaica19.9−8.688.732.2−20.6111.698.613.03.416.4
Mexico156.082.9469.062.0−22.9747.0463.0284.0−229.055.0
Nicaragua11.9−16.117.2−10.4−2.50.10.2−0.1−21.7−21.8
Panama31.6−7.124.027.9−14.761.756.05.7−19.3−13.6
Paraguay−10.212.16.3−2.85.421.5−16.17.2−8.9
Peru222.2208.4−55.8−26.8−211.9136.1−11.9148.0−102.145.9
Trinidad and Tobago59.8−12.3−31.4−69.03.2−49.7−44.3−5.40.7−4.7
Uruguay2.719.218.6−17.02.726.266.8−40.6144.7104.1
Venezuela157.0−291.7161.0−48.4−19.3−41.4111.0−152.4155.02.6
Region2,133.6−94.21,469.2−309.5−353.22,845.92,919.3−73.4591.4518.0
1970
Argentina193.9−82.121.4−51.0−11.271.0305.4−234.4250.015.6
Barbados−7.017.2−9.21.030.0−29.024.7−4.3
Bolivia52.19.1−7.3−19.12.136.942.3−5.4−8.7−14.1
Brazil725.6−84.8541.0−338.8−88.6754.41,178.4−424.0685.0261.0
Chile165.0164.54.626.555.3415.9341.874.1−46.028.1
Colombia133.031.5156.213.110.1343.9365.0−21.110.1−11.0
Costa Rica106.5−11.915.5−6.6−17.186.498.6−12.2−1.4−13.6
Dominican Republic43.213.722.4−16.2−6.856.3130.3−74.056.2−17.8
Ecuador26.9−10.798.6−67.9−3.843.134.48.73.312.0
El Salvador40.9−26.0−13.3−13.4−1.3−13.1−15.12.09.311.3
Guatemala89.0−15.916.45.9−6.788.736.452.3−39.113.2
Guyana18.6−8.811.4−9.3−1.710.27.72.5−6.6−4.1
Haiti1−3.6−0.74.722.4−2.420.44.016.4−11.74.7
Honduras45.2−14.831.9−10.2−11.540.671.6−31.013.3−17.7
Jamaica49.0−12.4130.345.7−33.9178.7137.840.9−5.135.8
Mexico78.088.2390.075.0−88.2543.0720.0−177.0264.087.0
Nicaragua20.3−11.728.2−6.9−3.826.113.512.6−23.2−10.6
Panama31.1−15.323.084.5−28.494.996.0−1.120.219.1
Paraguay−4.91.8−1.07.2−1.51.69.3−7.76.2−1.5
Peru360.1269.6−183.190.4−271.2425.8 35.0420.8−125.7295.1
Trinidad and Tobago35.8−20.811.7−78.7−2.1−54.1−31.9−22.24.1−18.1
Uruguay24.420.612.5−30.16.934.3109.9−75.6127.151.5
Venezuela208.0−277.7143.0131.6−16.3188.6244.0−55.490.034.6
Region2,438.15.41,451.1−128.7−531.33,394.6 33,934.4−539.81,296.0756.2
1966–70
Argentina347.4−325.7−302.1−235.6−17.2−533.2315.8−849.0538.8−310.2
Barbados3.6−7.51.057.3−21.832.669.9−37.336.6−0.7
Bolivia252.1−17.920.1−95.5−5.5153.3184.4−31.1−43.6−74.7
Brazil2,185!1−503.41,341.0−616.3−346.52,059.93,991.9−1,932.01,849.0−83.0
Chile530.2737.67.730.9178.71,485.11,198.5286.6−51.0235.6
Colombia403.3−199.1590.1141.8−56.1900.0 21,079.0−179.0159.6−19.4
Costa Rica353.4−82.914.81.3−47.4239.2169.469.8−40.029.8
Dominican Republic76.680.0−109.1−61.1−14.5−28.1383.5−411.6354.5−57.1
Ecuador92.5−76.4212.0−142.6−28.157.4150.6−93.2167.674.4
El Salvador168.6−129.9−7.6−55.1−16.0−40.01.9−41.922.9−19.0
Guatemala312.4−96.051.5−18.6−25.8223.574.2149.3−141.97.4
Guyana60.0−15.245.5−49.8−1.239.329.69.7−23.8−14.1
Haiti1−13.0−10.7−2.676.9−3.347.3−13.360.6−54.06.6
Honduras201.8−52.866.9−40.4−28.4147.1229.5−82.450.9−31.5
Jamaica70.5−26.4470.1156.3−74.8595.7367.8227.9−75.3152.6
Mexico156.0336.81,646.0247.0−172.82,213.01,736.0477.0−65.0412.0
Nicaragua40.5−46.0116.1−22.9−10.077.780.1−2.4−99.4−101.8
Panama99.0−23.630.5218.6−64.0260.5241.019.5−2.916.6
Paraguay−51.820.735.424.7−5.923.181.9−58.826.5−32.3
Peru936.1800.0−296.8−44.1−806.1749.1 3209.7539.4−321.1218.3
Trinidad and Tobago241.8−40.1−125.6−280.16.3−197.7−209.712.0−3.78.3
Uruguay−53.660.242.1−88.07.2−32.1211.1−243.2725.9482.7
Venezuela530.0−1,046.9371.0−68.5−5.1−219.5288.0−507.5599.091.5
Region6,942.5−665.24,218.0−863.8−1,558.38,253.2 2, 310,870.8−2,617.63,609.6992.0
Average 1966–70
Argentina69.5−65.1−60.4−47.1−3.4−106.663.2−169.8107.8−62.0
Barbados0.7−1.50.211.5−4.46.514.0−7.57.3−0.1
Bolivia50.4−3.64.0−19.1−1.130.736.9−6.2−8.7−14.9
Brazil437.0−100.7268.2−123.3−69.3412.0798.4−386.4369.8−16.6
Chile106.0147.51.56.235.7297.0239.757.3−10.247.1
Colombia80.7−39.8118.028.4−11.2180.02215.8−35.831.9−3.9
Costa Rica70.7−16.63.00.3−9.547.833.914.0−8.06.0
Dominican Republic15.316.0−21.8−12.2−2.9−5.676.7−82.370.9−11.4
Ecuador18.5−15.342.4−28.5−5.611.530.1−18.633.514.9
El Salvador33.7−26.0−1.5−11.0−3.2−8.00.4−8.44.6−3.8
Guatemala62.5−19.210.3−3.7−5.244.714.829.9−28.41.5
Guyana12.0−3.09.1−10.0−0.27.95.91.9−4.8−2.8
Haiti1−2.6−2.1−0.515.4−0.79.5−2.712.1−10.81.3
Honduras40.4−10.613.4−8.1−5.729.445.9−16.510.2−6.3
Jamaica14.1−5.394.031.3−15.0119.173.645.6−15.130.5
Mexico31.267.4329.249.4−34.6442.6347.295.4−13.082.4
Nicaragua8.1−9.223.2−4.6−2.015.516.0−0.5−19.9−20.4
Panama19.8−4.76.143.7−12.852.148.23.9−0.63.3
Paraguay−10.44.17.14.9−1.24.616.4−11.85.3−6.5
Peru187.2160.0−59.4−8.8−161.2149.8342.0107.9−64.243.7
Trinidad and Tobago48.4−8.0−25.1−56.01.3−39.5−42.02.4−0.71.7
Uruguay−10.712.08.4−17.61.4−6.442.2−48.6145.296.5
Venezuela106.0−209.474.2−13.7−1.0−43.957.6−101.5119.818.3
Region1,388.5−133.0843.6−172.8−311.71,650.62, 32,174.2−523.5721.9198.4

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Includes an estimated $20 million mandatory return of flight capital in 1967.

Includes an estimated $160 million mandatory return of flight capital in 1970.

Fiscal years October 1 through September 30.

Includes an estimated $20 million mandatory return of flight capital in 1967.

Includes an estimated $160 million mandatory return of flight capital in 1970.

Table 22.Methodology Used in Tables 14 and 16—Example of Argentina(Values in millions of U.S. dollars)
1966–70
1.International reserve change588.8
2.Domestic price increase over and above price increase in rest of world79.1%
3.Stock of money and quasi-money at beginning of period (December 31, 1965)3,149.9
4.Effect ascribed to domestic price increase over and above price increase in rest of world (2×3)2,491.6
5.Credit expansion in excess of that consistent with external and internal equilibrium (4–1)1,902.8
6.Actual credit expansion7,462.9
7.Credit expansion consistent with external and internal equilibrium (6–5)5,560.1
8.Index of credit expansion in excess of that consistent with external and internal equilibrium (6/7)134.2
9.Exchange rate depreciation112.7%
10.Effect ascribed to exchange rate depreciation (9×3)3,549.9
11.Credit expansion consistent with external equilibrium only (7+10)9,110.0
12.Index of credit expansion short of that consistent with external equilibrium only (6/11)81.9

Les balances des paiements des pays d’Amérique latine et des Antilles, 1966–70

Résumé

Dans cette étude, les auteurs ont analysé l’évolution des balances des paiements des pays d’Amérique latine et des Antilles au cours de la période de cinq années 1966–70. Ils se sont d’abord efforcés de vérifier si une “bonne” performance allait de pair avec la croissance économique, ou si elle suppose des politiques qui freinent l’expansion de la production. C’est là une relation fort complexe, et l’on a trouvé que ni l’une ni l’autre de ces hypothèses n’est valide. L’étude évalue ensuite quantitativement, pour chaque pays et pour la région prise dans son ensemble, les variations de la capacité d’importation, telles que permettent de les mesurer les changements intervenant dans le volume des exportations, les termes de l’échange, les entrées de capitaux à long et à moyen terme et les recettes nettes au titre des services et transferts. Les variations de ces éléments de la balance des paiements ont été considérées comme échappant essentiellement au contrôle des autorités. Afin de déterminer si les politiques suivies dans les domaines des taxes à l’importation, du contingentement des importations et restrictions de change, de la gestion du crédit et du taux de change, ont conduit à une sous-utilisation ou à une utilisation excessive de la capacité d’importation, on a comparé les variations de cette dernière à celles du volume effectif des importations.

Tandis que les jugements portés sur les modifications effectuées au contingentement et à l’imposition des importations étaient surtout qualitatifs, les auteurs ont essayé de mesurer quantitativement l’impact des politiques en matière de taux de change et de crédit. Ils ont évalué la politique en matière de crédit en partant du principe que les variations du crédit bancaire doivent être égales aux variations de l’épargne de la communauté sous forme de créances sur le système bancaire engendrées par les changements intervenus dans le revenu réel et dans la préférence pour la liquidité. Ils ont supposé qu’un tel volume de crédit bancaire était compatible avec l’équilibre de la balance des paiements et la stabilité des prix intérieurs par rapport aux fluctuations des prix à l’étranger. Les ruptures constatées dans l’équilibre des paiements et la stabilité des prix relatifs pouvaient par conséquent être attribuées à des écarts entre le stock de crédit bancaire et le stock d’équilibre.

Afin de déterminer dans quelle mesure le taux d’expansion du crédit était supérieur ou inférieur au taux compatible avec l’équilibre de la balance des paiements et la stabilité des prix relatifs, les auteurs ont établi un rapport entre les mouvements effectifs des réserves de change et les fluctuations des prix relatifs, d’une part, et le stock de monnaie et de quasi-monnaie au début de la période, d’autre part. La différence entre le volume d’expansion du crédit compatible avec l’équilibre tant interne qu’externe et son accroissement effectif leur a permis de mesurer l’excès ou l’insuffisance de ce taux d’expansion par rapport à son taux d’équilibre. Ils ont également mesuré l’effet du taux de change à l’aide d’une méthode analogue.

Les auteurs sont arrivés à la conclusion que les modifications apportées à l’imposition et au contingentement des importations ne semblaient pas avoir joué un rôle majeur dans la gestion de la demande d’importation. Ils ont confirmé l’hypothèse selon laquelle les pays qui ont suivi une politique active en matière de taux de change ont été en mesure de compenser les effets d’une expansion excessive du crédit sur la balance des paiements. Ce sont les plus petits pays qui, dans l’ensemble, ont adopté une politique de crédit restrictive, alors que tous les grands, à l’exception du Mexique, ont suivi des politiques actives en matière de taux de change. En raison du poids que représentent ces derniers pays, la politique des taux de change s’est révélée le plus puissant instrument de gestion de la balance des paiements, pendant la période considérée, pour la région prise dans son ensemble.

La balanza de pagos de América Latina y el Caribe, 1966–70

Resumen

En este artículo se analiza la evolución de la balanza de pagos en América Latina y el Caribe durante el quinquenio 1966–70. En primer término se trata de verificar si un comportamiento “favorable” de la balanza de pagos anda de par en par con el crecimiento económico, o si supone políticas que desalientan el aumento del producto. Se trata de una relación compleja, y ninguna de las dos hipótesis resulta válida. En el estudio se procede después a medir cuantitativamente, para cada país y para la región en general, las variaciones de la capacidad de importación, la que se mide por las variaciones en el volumen de exportación, las relaciones de intercambio, la entrada de capital a medio y largo plazo y los ingresos netos por servicios y transferencias. Se considera que las variaciones de estos componentes de la balanza de pagos están fundamentalmente fuera del control de las autoridades. Para determinar si las políticas de impuestos de importación, restricciones a la importación y cambiarias, manejo del crédito y del tipo de cambio resultaron en una sobreutilización o subutilización de la capacidad de importación, se comparan las variaciones de la capacidad de importación con las del volumen efectivo de las importaciones.

Si bien los criterios adoptados en relación con las variaciones de los impuestos y las restricciones a la importación son en gran parte cualitativos, se trata de medir cuantitativamente el impacto de las políticas crediticias y cambiarias. La evaluación de la política crediticia se efectúa en el supuesto de que las variaciones del crédito bancario deben ser iguales a las variaciones del ahorro total de la comunidad en forma de activos sobre el sistema bancario originados por variaciones del ingreso real y de la preferencia por la liquidez. Se supone que tal volumen de crédito bancario es consistente con el equilibrio de la balanza de pagos y la estabilidad de precios internos en relación con las variaciones de los precios en el extranjero. Así, las desviaciones con respecto al equilibrio de los pagos y a la estabilidad de los precios relativos indicarían que el crédito bancario total difiere del volumen de equilibrio.

Para medir el grado en que la expansión del crédito es mayor o menor que la que es consistente con el equilibrio de la balanza de pagos y la estabilidad de los precios relativos, se relacionan los movimientos reales de las reservas externas y las variaciones de los precios relativos con el volumen de dinero y cuasidinero al principio del período. La diferencia entre el volumen de expansión del crédito consistente con el equilibrio interno y externo y la expansión crediticia efectiva proporciona una medida del exceso o deficiencia con respecto a la tasa de expansión de equilibrio. El efecto de los tipos de cambio se mide con una metodología análoga.

Se llega a la conclusión de que las variaciones de los impuestos a la importación y de las restricciones no parecen haber tenido una función importante en el manejo de la demanda de importación. El estudio confirma la hipótesis de que los países que han seguido una política cambiaria activa pudieron compensar los efectos de una expansión crediticia excesiva sobre la balanza de pagos. En general, los países que siguieron políticas crediticias moderadas fueron los más pequeños, mientras que los más grandes, con la excepción de México, siguieron políticas activas de tipos de cambio. En vista de la importancia que tienen los países más grandes, la política cambiaria se convirtió en el más potente instrumento de la política de balanza de pagos en la región en su totalidad durante el período estudiado.

*Mr. Robichek, a Deputy Director in the Western Hemisphere Department of the Fund, studied at Harvard University. Mr. Sansón, a Senior Advisor in the same department, studied at George Washington University and was a visiting fellow at Yale University in 1969–70.
1This paper is a revised version of a paper presented to the Tenth Meeting of Technicians of Central Banks of the American Continent held in Caracas, Venezuela, November 17–26, 1971.
2All measurements of exchange rate changes are given in this paper as percentage changes of the local currency value of foreign currencies.

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